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ABSTRACT
SPAIN’S RAPID TRANSITION: A CASE STUDY OF LATE MODERNIZATION

Throughout the mid-twentieth century, Spain was under the control of dictator Francisco
Franco. Under Franco’s rule, while the rest of the world was modernizing, Spain was a
very conservative and traditional society, with many of its traditions and ideals centered
on the Catholic Church. As time went on, Franco was forced to loosen his control on
Spain ever so slightly, allowing Spain the freedom to begin the process of modernization.
However, it was not until after the death of the dictator that the modernization process in
Spain was able to fully take off. Spain is a unique case of modernization, as it
modernized very rapidly and much later than most of its European neighbors. Using
qualitative data such as books and scholarly articles, as well as quantitative data in the
form of surveys from the World Values Survey, in addition to comparing Spain with
other countries, this thesis examines the validity of Spain as a modern state and attempts
to understand the process of modernization that Spain underwent after Franco’s death in
1975. Special attention is paid to the three separate modernization spheres: the economic
sphere, the social/cultural sphere and the political sphere. Although the three go hand-inhand this thesis shows that the economy of Spain modernized first, bringing the
social/cultural modernization and eventually political modernization with it. Additionally,
through the analysis of surveys, and comparison with other countries, it illustrates that
Spain is in fact a modern nation by most standards.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

In the Spring of 2017, I studied in Málaga, Spain. One Sunday I was attending
mass, as I did every Sunday, in the beautiful Cathedral affectionately referred to as “La
Manquita” or one-armed lady, because it only has one completed tower. The beautiful
stained-glass windows let in a light that basked the whole Cathedral in a warm glow.
Looking around the cathedral I was in awe of the vast domed ceilings and all of the little
intricate details that made this sixteenth century building so remarkable today, nearly 500
years later. I glanced to my left and to my right and was surprised to see so few people
attending this mass. From what I knew, Spain was a very Catholic Country, so where was
everyone? I attended mass in many other churches throughout Spain and was always
underwhelmed by the number of people in attendance. When I first arrived, I had spoken
to my host family about mass and discovered that they were Catholic but did not practice.
Sitting in mass, in the midst of the ceremony of it all, I began to wonder what changed, in
a “Catholic Country” like Spain, with a Catholic church on practically every corner, to
make mass attendance so low.
I knew that Spain had a rich history that was completely intertwined with the
Catholic Church. I knew that Spain, the country that it is today, was fully united under
Catholic rule, in the fifteenth century by Los Reyes Católicos or in English, “The Catholic
Monarchs”. I also knew that the dictator Francisco Franco heavily promoted the Catholic
Church during his time in power between 1939 and 1975.
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While I was in Spain, I took a Spanish culture class in which we spent a great deal
of time studying Franco and what life was like during his regime. He was a very Catholic
dictator and forced the Spanish people to practice a conservative version of their Catholic
faith. As I learned more about the Franco regime, I began to wonder if his strict rule
based on the rule of the Catholic Church is what pushed many people away from the
Catholic Church after his death. We also learned about the very large family sizes during
Franco’s dictatorship whereas at the same time, in many other modern countries family
sizes were decreasing. This is contrasted by the fact that today, Spain has one of the
lowest birth rates in Europe. I began to wonder how much of Spain’s transition from a
conservative country during Franco’s day to a much more liberal country after his death,
was a result of using a newfound freedom to push back against Franco’s oppression after
his death, and how much of it was simply the result of modernization?
Spain is a very interesting case. Modernization involves three separate
dimensions: economic, social, and political. When countries modernize, these three
spheres can move together or separately. After the Franco Regime Spain began to
modernize rapidly. Politically Spain modernized quickly by rapidly transitioning to a
democracy, but after visiting Spain I began to question the idea of Spain being a very
modern nation as a whole. Typically, “modern” countries tend to be more secular, and
less traditional socially and culturally. Historically Spain is largely Catholic but has very
few people practicing today. Spain also still clings to its cultural traditions like
bullfighting. There is this idea of Spain being this nation that modernized very rapidly. I
wanted to test the validity of this. I looked at Spain before, during, and after the Franco
regime in order to evaluate the modernization of Spain. I wanted to know, how modern is
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Spain really? What explained the modernization of Spain? Did Spain actually modernize
at the same rate before and after Franco’s death? Is Spain’s modernization simply a result
of its transition to democracy? Did one factor, social, economic, or political change start
the modernization process? I wanted to reevaluate the common story of Spain’s
modernization. I focused on evaluating the affect that the Franco Regime had on Spain’s
modernization and compared Spain with Italy, a similar country, in order to evaluate its
modernization.

Theoretical Framework
Modernization is the process by which traditional societies transition to more
advanced “modern” societies. It began during the industrial revolution and affects
countries all over the world. Traditional societies are often rural, agrarian and even feudal
societies. They tend to lack a lot of modern technology, especially with manufacturing,
that industrialized societies rely on. Traditional societies today are often poor, as they
cannot keep up with industrialized societies, with mass production and technology.
Traditional societies also tend to value religion as one of the most important parts of
society. In modern societies in, “there is a predominance of secular, individualistic and
scientific values and corresponding role clusters” (Knöbl 2003, 96). Generally, as
countries industrialize they are ushered into a process of economic modernization that
brings about a process of urbanization and reduces the heavy often sustenance based
agricultural segment for a more industrial economy. Modernized nations are also often
much more secular than traditional nations.
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The process of modernization is a complicated one, and involves three main
aspects, political, cultural, and economic modernization. Whole nations, or even small
segments can undergo just one aspect of this process, or all of the aspects at one time;
there is no perfect formula for the process. A simple way to look at it is to think of
modernization as a continuum, where different segments of society can move along it as
they modify their behavior and attitudes to become more or less traditional. Throughout
this thesis I will describe modernization theory in detail and use some of the ideas about
the process of modernization in order to examine the modernization story of Spain.
Under Franco, Spain was very much a traditional, rural, agrarian society. As the
rest of the world modernized, Spain stood at a standstill for much of Franco’s regime, cut
off from interaction with the rest of the world. Towards the end of Franco’s life, he began
to loosen his isolationist policies. As Spain began to actively seek out tourists from other
nations, Franco had less control using censorship and the media because Spaniards had
access to more information. After his death, Spain began a rather rapid transition to
democracy and, as a result, appeared to become a much more modern country.
Today, Spain is a much more secular, urban, and industrial society. Some of this
could potentially be attributed to its addition to the European Union in 1986. As Spain
was able to modernize its economy by trading with other countries in the EU, and as it
was more and more open to tourism, Spain was able to modernize very rapidly as a
society. I imagined that Spaniards were much more likely to embrace modernization after
being oppressed for so long. I hypothesized that by forcing the Spanish people to follow
his policies (being a dictator), Franco unintentionally pushed them away from the policies
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themselves after his death ended the repression and they had more freedom to do as they
pleased.
From our definition of modernization, we know that typically as nations
modernize they become more secular. This was definitely true for Europe, however I
hypothesized, that it took longer for Spain to become more secular than it took for the
many other countries because of the policies of the Franco regime. I also hypothesized
that Spain is still rather conservative, in many aspects but especially socially and
culturally, by European standards. Additionally, birth control was illegal during Franco's
regime, and families were much larger, I hypothesized that once it became legal family
size decreased. Finally, I understand that women's roles have changed significantly since
Franco's day but I hypothesized that women still don't have quite as many opportunities
because of the lasting legacy of the gender roles from Franco's day. I hoped to test all of
these theories and compare Spain with Italy as well as other European countries in order
to see how Spain did or did not follow the general modernization trends of the other
European countries.
In order to understand how modern Spain is today, I designed a modernization
scale where Spain will receive a score between 1 and 6. A score of 1 means signifies that
Spain is very modern, while 6 means it is less modern. I chose to compare Spain with
countries that are generally considered “modern” by most standards, some within Europe,
and some outside of Europe. I compared Spain with Sweden, Japan, Germany, and the
United States, as well as with Italy, which is a country with a similar history and
geographic location. I used a World Values Survey data set with data between 2005 and
2009, as it was the most complete set of data for all of these countries together. They
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each received a score out of 6 for a variety of modernization factors for economic,
political, and social/cultural modernization. I averaged their score for each of these
factors to give them a score for economic, a political, and a social/cultural modernization.
These scores for the different aspects of modernization will be helpful to gage the
modernity of Spain for each different aspect compared to other modern countries. Finally,
I averaged the scores each country received for each aspect of modernization to give
them an overall modernization score between 1 and 6.

Country

Table 1.1: Modernization Scale Scores
Germany
Italy
Japan Sweden

Economic
Score
Political Score
Social/Cultural
Score
Average
Modernization
Score

United
States

3.6

4.2

4

2

3.8

2.667

3.667

5

1.333

5

3.241

4.321

3.714

1.759

4.038

3.169

4.063

4.238

1.697

4.279

Research Design
Spain is an interesting example of modernization and can provide unique insights
into how a country modernizes after a dictatorship, when it is surrounded by mostly
democratic and modern nations, as well as how late modernization might look. I used a
number of qualitative and quantitative data to measure how various social factors
changed in Spain during the Franco dictatorship, the transition to democracy and today. I
used data sets, when they were available to get a quantitative measure of some of the
changes in Spain but also supported my quantitative data with qualitative data such as
books and scholarly articles to provide background information and support. I measured
6

factors such as church attendance, value placed on the church, family size, women in the
workplace and views on divorce and abortion, in order to get a picture of just how much
and just how rapidly Spain was able to modernize. I also compared some of these factors
to Italy to get an idea of how Spain modernized compared to another similar country.

Case Selection
Spain is a unique case because as most of Europe modernized throughout the
middle of the twentieth century, Spain was under the control of a dictator and stayed at a
bit of a standstill. Franco kept the economy closed off, and the industrial revolution did
not reach Spain until the 1960s. Spain remained traditional during the dictatorship while
much of the rest of Europe modernized. During Franco’s regime Spain was ultraconservative, with traditional values, a traditional agrarian based economy, and politics
that did not fit in with a rapidly modernizing Europe. Because Spain was able to
transition to democracy so rapidly after Franco’s death and because Spain was able to
modernize very rapidly and catch up with the rest of the EU so quickly, Spain is a very
interesting case of modernization and can provide insights into the way a country
modernizes after a dictatorship, if it is surrounded by other more modern nations.
I focus on Spain since 1950. In order to provide background information, I
researched Spain before the Franco Regime; the factors that lead to the Spanish Civil
War, and what changed, politically, economically, and socially after Franco took power. I
studied what changed throughout the Franco dictatorship and after Franco’s death as it
rapidly democratized and modernized, so although I will discuss the early twentieth
century and before, my analysis begins with the second half of the twentieth century.

7

I have a good grasp on the history of Spain, as well as the culture. I am familiar
with the different histories and cultures associated with different regions of Spain as well
as the failure to achieve one national Spanish identity over the years even dating back to
the beginnings of Spain as its own country with the union of the Catholic Monarchs
Ferdinand and Isabel. I studied abroad in Spain, so I have firsthand experience that led
me to many of my hypotheses. I based my hypothesis on things I have learned over the
years about Spain, and patterns I was able to see while I was living there. Additionally, I
am very interested in Spanish culture, so this is something that I enjoyed researching.
Because of my nine years of experience studying Spanish I have a good grasp of the
language and thus had access to more sources that were not translated into English. I also
studied at the University of Málaga lived with host parents who were both alive during
the end of Franco’s dictatorship and helped to give me an idea of the culture now
compared to when they were young.

Data
I used a number of data sources, both quantitative and qualitative. It was difficult
to find data sets for Spain dating back to the time of the Franco Regime, but the World
Values Survey had data for Spain from 1981-2014.
I had difficulty finding public attitude data from the Franco Dictatorship. I did
find some more recent surveys that provided insight into church attendance, family size,
women in the workforce, and views on more modern social topics like attitudes towards
divorce and abortion. I used the quantitative data to look at how each of these factors
changed throughout the transition to democracy and today. I also compared Spain to
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other similar “modern” countries using the same data sets with the same information, in
order to see to what extent, the Franco dictatorship really affected the Spain’s
modernization, compared to other countries. Comparing Spain to other countries helped
to show how liberal or conservative Spain actually is in comparison to other countries.
I used a number of books and scholarly articles detailing the process of the
transition from a dictatorship to a democracy, with insight into the reasons behind the
Spanish Civil War and life before it. These books and articles provided me with a good
base of background information to support my claims as well as provided me with
possible insights into the reasons for the way that Spain modernized.
I found a number of surveys on social attitudes in Spain. However, many of them
only began in the 1980s or 1990s after Franco’s death. I decided to focus on the World
Values Survey with data about Spain beginning in 1981 to 2014 that had data for most of
the modernization factors I was looking for. The World Values Survey conducts
“nationally representative surveys” by conducting interviews in nearly 100 countries.
They ask a variety of questions to try to gain an understanding for social values, attitudes,
and stereotypes; societal well-being; social capital, trust and organizational membership;
economic values; corruption; migration; post-materialist index; science and technology;
religious values; security; ethical values and norms; political interest and political
participation; political culture and political regimes; and demography. The World Values
Survey provides the data analysis online with easy tables and charts that are easy to
manipulate so that analysis is simple. They also provide time series data, which is
helpful. It is also possible to download the data into an excel document. Spain did not
have a fully comprehensive survey for each year, but I was still able to get a lot of good
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insight into the modernization of Spain from the surveys they did have, and the questions
they asked.
I had hoped to find some more public attitude data from during the Franco
dictatorship but in order to supplement the more recent opinion data I found, I really
focused on qualitative data for the period before the 1980s in order to get a picture of
what life was like during the Franco regime. That way where my data about actual church
attendance and public opinion fell short I was able show the value he placed on
Catholicism and the way life had to revolve around it. Some of the authors that provided
the most detailed information and analysis of Spanish History that proved to be especially
helpful in supplementing my quantitative analysis were Tusell, Arango, Payne, and Ross,
though I used a wide variety of different qualitative sources.

Method
This thesis is mostly descriptive, as I explore the different dimensions of Spain’s
modernization. I look at Spain’s historical modernization process to see where it begins,
and what changes. I look at the timing and the process of political, economic, and social
change in Spain at some points even going as far back to the beginning of the twentieth
century in order to understand how Spain got to where it did before the dictatorship, and
how Spain was able to transition so rapidly after the dictatorship. I used a wide variety
books and academic articles in order to paint a larger picture of Spain as it modernized. I
also used World Values Survey Data in order to look at how Spanish citizens view the
democratic and economic state of Spain today and how that has changed since the end of
the transition to democracy, as well as how their social values changed since the end of
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the transition. I created a modernity scale, so measure how modern Spain is compared to
a number of other nations that are typically considered to be modern. I also compared
Spain with Italy throughout the thesis in order to compare how Spain modernized over
time, with a similar country. My goal was to provide a clear picture of Spain’s
modernization process, to be able to provide an understanding of why it modernized the
way it did, and to analyze how modern Spain really is.

Chapter Outlines
In the introduction, I describe the process of my research and briefly outline
everything that I will discuss. I discuss some of the questions I had as I began my
research, as well as the hypotheses that I came up with and the background for why I
asked these questions and came up with these hypotheses. I refrain from entering into too
much detail as I go into a lot more detail later in the thesis, but I introduce some of the
basics of modernization theory, and the situation that Spain faced during the Franco
Regime and before. I also explain the method that I will use throughout the entire thesis.
In Chapter 2, I describe and compare the relevant literature on Modernization to
give my readers and idea of what it is and the factors that go into it and how it works. I
introduce some of the important arguments and theorists and go into much more detail
about the three main subsections of modernization, political modernization, economic
modernization, and social/cultural modernization. I also go into detail about some of the
specific indicators that can be used to test for modernization.
In Chapter 3, I describe the changes in Spanish history over the course of the
twentieth century to the present beginning with the Second Republic. I provide relevant
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details about the political climate leading up to the Civil War as well as the Civil War,
and then discuss the Franco Dictatorship. I split the dictatorship into two sections to
review the first, more oppressive half of his leadership, then the second half of his
regime, when the country began the process of modernization. I then discuss the
transition to democracy.
Chapter 4, is where I discuss the data analysis both quantitative and qualitative I
have done on Spain’s economic factors and how modern they seem to be. I discuss some
of the relevant economic history in Spain and use qualitative examples to analyze Spain’s
modernization process historically. Then I use quantitative data from the World Values
Survey in order to look at Spain’s sense of economic modernity after the transition to
democracy from 1981 until 2014.
In Chapter 5, I discuss the data analysis both quantitative and qualitative I have
done on Spain’s social/cultural factors and how modern they seem to be. I provide
qualitative historical data that describes some of the social and cultural modernization
process throughout the second half of the Franco regime and the transition. Then I
provide more insight through quantitative data from the World Values Survey, providing
public opinion data from 1981-2014 that shows the changing social values in Spain. I
look at how public opinion on a variety of social/cultural factors has changed over time in
order to further analyze the modern state of Spain and the timing of these changes.
In Chapter 6, I discuss the data analysis both quantitative and qualitative I have
done on Spain’s political factors and how modern it seems to be. I begin with relevant
historical data that illustrates the political transition throughout the dictatorship and then
the transition to democracy. I then provide quantitative data from the World Values
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Survey that gives public opinion from 1981 to 2014 giving an idea of the current opinions
of Spaniards of democracy.
Finally, in the conclusion, I summarize my findings and analyze how modern
Spain is overall once I take into account all the factors and attempt to explain where and
why it is lacking. I take the most relevant details of economic, social/cultural, and
political modernization and put them together to create an image of Spain’s overall
modernity. I give Spain a score out of 6 from a modernization scale developed using
other countries that are generally accepted to be “modern” as well as Italy, a similar
country. I also compare how modern Spain has become in recent years, compared to
other countries.
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CHAPTER 2: MODERNIZATION

Modernization describes the economic, political, and cultural transitions and/or
changes that countries undergo as they move from poor or underdeveloped to wealthy or
developed. Modern nations are generally defined as industrial, urban, and secular
societies, which are typically better off economically. Poor, underdeveloped, traditional
societies are societies that have not modernized yet, or are potentially in the early stages
of modernization. The “modernization paradigm,” which gained importance in the United
States following the Second World War, sees that modernization is a universal pattern
that all societies go through as they transition from “traditional” agrarian societies to
“modern” industrial societies through interrelated cultural, political, and economic
changes (Cohen 2006).
Modernization has three dimensions: economic modernization, political
modernization, and social/cultural modernization. Generally, the economic capabilities of
a society are increased through industrialization, while political capabilities are increased
through bureaucratization (Inglehart 1997, 5). Social modernization is increased through
more urbanization, featuring more secular values as well as a smaller family unit. Nils
Gilman (2003) also argued that traditional cultural beliefs and practices can inhibit
industrialization, which thus inhibits modernization (Cohen 2006).
In order to understand modernization and modernization theory, it is important to
understand “modernity.” The social theory behind modernity grew during the 19th
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century and it is essentially a “civilizational epoch” that originated in Western Europe
and North America, but now is a global phenomenon. It includes rather distinct forms of
economic, political, and social organization (Cohen 2006).

Modernization Theory
The seeds of modernization theory actually originated during the Enlightenment
and continued with classic theories of social change, such as those of Durkheim and
Weber (Marsh 2014, 263). However, modernization theory can really be traced back to a
response of American political elites after the Second World War, especially with the
impact of the Cold War and the emergence of the so-called “third world” into world
politics following the disintegration of many European colonial empires (Tipps 1973,
200). Much of its ideological origin stemmed from anti-communism sentiment in the
United States and supported US imperialism (Conrad 2012). This idea supported that the
United States was a clear example of what a modern state should look like, and all other
countries should look to the United States as a model. Industrialization and urbanization
were seen as driving forces from the beginning of modernization theory, so it is fitting
that economic development was stressed as well (Marsh 2014, 263-264). Lerner (1967)
actually designated urbanization and industrialization as the two most basic variables in
the development process (Lerner 1967; Bernstein 1971, 152).
At the heart of modernization theory lie the ideas of some of the “founding
fathers” of sociology, such as Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, and Ferdinand Toennies, as
well as “proto-sociologists” Karl Marx and Alexis de Tocqueville (Greenfeld 1992, 17).
Arguably the most influential proponents of modernization theory were Marx and Weber.
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They agreed that “economic, cultural, and political changes go together in coherent
patterns” (Inglehart 1997, 14) but they disagreed on why these changes go together.
Modernization theory deals with how societies change. Marx believed that economic and
technological change determined political and cultural change, whereas Weber believed
that culture “shapes” economic and political life (Inglehart 1997, 14-15). Inglehart
believes that economics shape culture and politics but it also works in reverse, saying that
political, economic, and cultural changes all go together naturally because “societies
without mutually supportive political, economic, and cultural systems are unlikely to
survive for long” (Inglehart 1997, 15).
During the Protestant Reformation, while the English claimed Puritanism, the
religious movement of the Germans was Pietism. Pietism can be differentiated from
Puritanism in that while Puritanism was the idea of a group striving to move upward in a
mobile society, Pietism stemmed from a society that was relatively static and whose
members knew hardship and disaster over worldly success (Greenfeld 1992, 314-315).
Max Weber (1958) wrote, “The virtues favored by Pietism were more those on the one
hand of the faithful official, clerk, laborer, or domestic worker, and on the other hand of
the predominantly patriarchal employer with the pious condescension” (Weber 1958,
139). Basically, German Pietism was the way that faithful officials, clerks, laborers, and
domestic workers were Protestant, which held a great importance in the way they did
their work. Passion soon replaced scriptural learning, becoming the highest religious and
moral virtue, as Pietist notions spread. Weber argued that Protestantism influenced the
way that people did their work and served as a driver of capitalism. He maintained that
the new Protestantism created certain more secular societal values, which were associated
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with modernity (Weber 1958). Weber argued that the nobility was attracted to Pietism
because of “Emotionalism” as it served as “a religious dilettantism for the leisure
classes,” essentially Weber said that through the new protestant ideals, people were able
to pick and choose which aspects of religion they wanted to participate in, allowing
society to become naturally more secular (Greenfeld 1992, 318).
Some of the principal assumptions of modernization theory include the idea that
modernization is a social process that is associated with economic development and that
it is a process constituting a ‘universal pattern’ (Bernstein 1971, 141). Essentially there is
a pattern in which, if the situation is right, economic development leads to other social
(and political) developments. Lerner considered modernization to be “the social process
of which development is the economic component” (Lerner 1967, 21) whereas Apter
(1967) looked at development, modernization, and industrialization as simply decreasing
in generality (Bernstein 1971, 141). While some theorists are most concerned with the
structural aspects of modernization, others find that modernization has more to do with a
transformation of culture and personality of a population (Bernstein 1971, 141). Most
social scientists agree that modernization is a transformational and progressive social
change. It touches just about every aspect of society and as one sphere is transformed, it
tends to produce complimentary transformations in other spheres (Tipps 1973, 202).
There are many different approaches to modernization theory. While some, like
Manfred Halpern (1966), look at modernization as a response to change rather than a type
of change, others, like Benjamin Schwartz (1972), rely on Max Weber’s ideas looking at
modernization “in terms of the expansion of man’s rational control over his physical and
social environment” (Tipps 1973, 203). Eisenstadt (1966) argued that two things
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characterize modernization: a type of change and a response to a change. The type of
change is structural differentiation, where societies move from simple to more complex
societies. And the response to change is “the capacity of institutions to absorb
‘continually changing problems and demands’” (Tipps 1973, 203). Some associate
modernization with industrialization and economic development, while others emphasize
man’s control over nature and his social environment, and still others see modernization
as a total transformation of all aspects of life.
Most modernization theories can fit into one of two categories. Some are “critical
value” theories because they associate modernization with only one type of social
change. For example, for Levy (1966) modernization had the same definition as
‘industrialization’. Others are “dichotomous,” because they define modernization in a
way that describes the process of traditional societies transitioning to become modern
societies. The dichotomous view, which is the one that will be focused on throughout this
thesis, looks at modernization as a transition or series of transitions involving economic
change, political change, and social change (Tipps 1973, 203-204).
Some of the dynamic forces of modernity that most contemporary theorists agree
about, as summarized by Cohen (2006), include capitalism, scientific technology, the
nation-state, and the culture of individualism. Military forces, social services,
bureaucracies, a judicial system, educational systems, and tax collection services can all
be found within a nation-state. As the economy increases, and the middle class grows,
individuals become more educated, leading to further social changes and eventually
greater political participation, essential pieces of the modern puzzle. Another thing that
most social theorists agree on is that modernity is brought about by a series of political,
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economic, and social changes, and it continually fosters further changes, making social
circumstances different for each new generation. However, it is important to note that
societies do not modernize as a whole; changes begin in different places gradually
spreading throughout a society. All the changes work together, as the economy of a
society does better, there is often the rise of a middle class that has more opportunities for
higher education, leading to more political participation and eventually social and
political changes. It works as a cycle with economic, social, and political changes feeding
off of each other creating even further change. However, modernity is unpredictable,
theorists do not all agree on where exactly it will lead in the future (Cohen 2006).
Capitalism is a feature of economic modernity and is subject to constant cycles of
expansion and contraction; it is constantly changing searching for ways to increase
profitability. Likewise, with the rise in scientific technology comes unpredictable change.
Technology is integrated into all aspects of a modern society: in the workplace, in
agriculture, in the military sector, and in the media. Additionally, modern states, which
are themselves a product of modernity, serve as agents of change that lead to even further
modernization. Modern states often have state-run schools, as well as social health and
welfare institutions, and have the ability to transform the social circumstances of their
citizens (Cohen 2006).
Modernization is essentially the process of moving a traditional society into an
industrialized society. This process is seldom agreed upon and some of the most
important figures in modernization theory had vastly different ideas, which are important
to consider when examining the process of modernization. One of the leading figures in
American sociology was Talcott Parsons, who is credited with developing the
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modernization paradigm. He sought out the structural requirements that led to a highly
functioning social system, hoping to spread it across the globe. He determined that there
were four social functions that were necessary for any social system to survive and
develop, adaptation, goal attainment, integration, and latent pattern-maintenance (Reifer
2006; Holton 2006).

Criticisms of Modernization Theory
While modernization theory was the dominant perspective until the 1960s, it
began to face sharp criticism during the anti-war and civil rights movements. Although
some theorists like Wallerstein (1976) and Alexander (1995) find modernization to no
longer be viable for today’s society, it is arguably still very relevant. Globally there is
still an increasing shift from agrarian to industrial and eventually to service or
information-based societies. There is still an increase in urbanization as well as an
expansion on education, advancement in communications as well as transportation
technologies. There is increasing political democratization across the world and
increasing gender equality. All of these things are important factors of modernization and
are still incredibly relevant today (Marsh 2014, 261-262).
One example of modernization theory criticism is concerned that there is
ethnocentrism underlying modernization theory. Eisenstadt (1966) suggested that the
Western experience created a model of modern society, and although he suggested
different routes he alluded to there being only one destination (Bernstein 1971, 146-148).
One critic was Immanuel Wallerstein (1976) who felt that the modernization paradigm
was a “shift from biological to cultural racism” (Reifer 2006). Essentially, he was saying
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that it was a way to exclude “the other” not by race but by the culture in which they were
a part of. He argued that modernization was designed to uphold the power and inequality
of capitalist nations, and that it distorted the history of the capitalist system. Essentially,
he argued that modernization was a Western notion that was meant to set up the Western
ideal as the “right way” and that non-Western states should become like Western nations
in order to be successful. He argued that it was created by Western nations in order to
keep themselves in power (Reifer 2006).
Although some modernization theorists have encouraged this idea, modernization
is not inherently Western. The idea comes from the fact that most of the successful
modernization breakthroughs took place in Western Europe, North America, Australia
and New Zealand. Additionally, according to Torfason and Ingram (2010) “the fact that
“the Western conception of democracy became a became a global ideology,” is generally
recognized and that democracy is becoming an increasing norm (Marsh 2014, 265). It is
also important to note that the main processes of modernization such as industrialization,
urbanization, technology, structural differentiation, and bureaucratic rationality are not
inherently Western and thus do not support the idea that modernization itself is Western
(Marsh 2014, 265).

Modernization Theory Today
There is a debate between many theorists over the cause of modernization. The
big question is: Does economic change lead to political and cultural change or does
political change and cultural change lead to economic change? Or are economic, political,
and social change all contingent on each other, and thus there is not one specific change
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that leads to other changes? Marx believed in “economic determinism” believing that
technology shapes a societies economy which changes its cultural and political situations.
Weber, on the other hand, believed that culture was more important. He argued that
culture shapes economic factors just as much as economic factors shape culture. Weber
believed that the “Protestant ethic” led to capitalism, which lead to industrial revolution,
which would lead to democratic revolution. More recent scholars like Bell (1973) argue
that cultural factors were important, but that the changes in the workforce actually
contributed to the change in cultural factors. Bell argued that if most of the workforce is
in the service sector of the economy, then there is an expansion in formal education
which according to Lerner (1958) and Inkeles, and Smith (1974) is one of the most
important factors that contributes to a “modern worldview” (Inglehart 1997, 9-10).

Economic Modernization
Economic factors serve as an important contributor for the modernization of
societies. One major economic factor is capitalism. Capitalism plays an important role in
the transition from a rural agrarian society to a more industrial society and thus is very
important to modernization theory. However, as Marx argued, material inequalities
generally accompany capitalism. Capitalist enterprises create a prosperous upper class
while huge poor populations do not have the structural means to escape the impoverished
class (Cohen 2006).
Industrialization also is one of the core processes of modernization that fits nicely
into the economic sphere. Industrialization leads to economic growth, which is one of the
goals of modernization (Inglehart 1997, 5). In fact, Lerner felt that urbanization and
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industrialization were the two most basic factors in the process of development.
Historically, typically as capitalist production increased, populations flooded to urban
centers (Bernstein 1971, 152). Lerner also felt that as urbanization increased so did
education and communication, which became essential to modernization and eventually
democratic development (Arat 1988, 22).

Social/Cultural Modernization
Cultural factors also serve as an important contributor for the modernization of
societies. There are generally multiple cultures in a single country, all of which are able
to contribute separately to modernization. Inglehart defines culture as “a system of
attitudes, values, and knowledge that is widely shared within a society and it transmitted
from generation to generation” (Inglehart 1997, 15). As certain socioeconomic conditions
shift, central parts of culture are subject to change but often the more central an aspect of
culture, the more likely it is to change from one generation to another rather than to
change within already socialized adults. Stable economic and political systems are
complimented by a cultural system (Inglehart 1997, 15).
Modern individualism plays a large part. Some factors that helped spur important
political changes were the humanistic appreciation of the beauty of the individual during
the 16th century and the belief in the equality and rights of all humans that really took off
after the American Revolution in 1776. Even in the 1950s, there was a large portion of
the middle class that conformed to cultural norms, but the more modern generation has
shown more trends towards individualism. The rise in the middle class often creates a
more consumer-based leisure society, which can often trigger a more secular and
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consumer society. Huntington (1991) argued that a large middle class could also help
create a larger more educated body, which is more politically attuned (Huntington 1991).
Another example of a cultural factor that accompanies modernization is what Weber
(1918) called the “disenchantment of the world” which said that humans replaced their
belief in forces like God in the public life with a form of government and knowledge of
the world that is not hinged on God. It did not simply mean moving away from religious
faith in private life but moving away from religious faith in the public sphere, for
example religious forces in government and economy. This signified a moving away, at
least in the public sphere, from spirituality (Cohen 2006).
Additionally, as societies modernize, gender rolls change and advance (Inglehart
1997, 8). The mid 1960s reflected a major change in cultural outlook as much of the
world saw major changes in society. Birth rates declined in most industrial societies, as
divorce rates, abortion rates, and illegitimate birth rates rose. In fact, the number of births
that took place outside of marriage increased by 250 percent and the divorce rate
quadrupled between 1960 and 1990 in the European Union. According to Inglehart,
aggregate statistical data supports that many of the norms that are associated with religion
and the importance of the family have grown weaker (Inglehart 1997, 56).
While some would argue that the decline in birth rates is simply due to the
advances in contraceptive technology, that is not the only explanation. Effective birth
control existed before the decline in birth rates; in fact, birth rates actually rose in the
1950s. Of course, the availability of effective birth control technology in the 1960s
played a huge part in the decline of birth rates, but another important factor was peoples’
decision to use it. People increasingly began to choose to have children later in life, or not
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at all, which reflected a change in social norms. The same can be said for the rapid
increase in divorce rates. Because it violated major religious norms, divorce had been
illegal for centuries. As the norms gradually began to weaken, public support for
legalizing divorce grew so although there was a rapid growth in the divorce rate after it
became legal in countries like Spain and Italy it reflects a norm that had been changing
gradually over time (Inglehart 1997, 56-57).

Political Modernization
Changes in the political sphere also play an important role in modernization
theory. A question that is often asked is “Does modernization lead to democracy?” While
Rostow argued in 1961 that economic development was conducive to democratization,
most social scientists were skeptical by 1970. At the time there were many authoritarian
regimes, particularly communist states that had solid economic growth, leading theorists
to agree that modernization could lead to democracy or dictatorship. Fascism and
communism are also both results of modernization, and it seems that democracy does not
necessarily come with modernization but it is more and more likely as societies move
further into modernization (Inglehart 1997).
Another critique of modernization theory stems from the paradoxes of modernity.
For example, many modern states tend towards democratic institutions, a part of which as
Durkheim argued, was the “cult of the dignity of the individual” (Cohen 2006).
Democratization and modernization are not inherently synonymous, but democracies are
a modern political entity, and thus democratization can often play a big part in
modernization. Some of the most important democratic ideals are equality, liberty, and
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impartiality in the public sphere, as well as the right to privacy in one’s personal life. Yet,
modern states are responsible for the worst genocides in history. Modern states are also
capable of raging ruthless wars and major oppression of its citizens (Cohen 2006).
Modernity is plagued with other paradoxes, including the trends towards the
differentiation between public and private life, contrasted with trends towards
centralization as people are drawn from the countryside into highly populated urban
centers. In the global world, more people come into contact with others who can make
cultural differences seem larger, while at the same time modern technology has made
access to global interaction significantly quicker and easier. Technology itself provides a
major paradox within modernization. It can be a good thing, used to make tools and to
improve society, but it also has byproducts like pollution, and makes total war and
genocide much easier (Cohen 2006).
Samuel Huntington calls the period that began in 1975 the “third wave of
democratization” characterizing it as “one of the most important developments in the
history of humankind” (Haerpfer, et al. 2009, 1; 41). Huntington observed that most of
the late twentieth century authoritarian movements were “almost always popular and
widely supported at first” but it was not until people began to be drawn to the freedoms
accompanied by democracy that they began to question the legitimacy of the
dictatorships (Welzel 2009, 83). Often once citizens realized the oppressive tendencies of
their authoritarian regime, they began to understand the benefits of the freedom that
generally accompanied democracy. Huntington felt that the rise in international
communications helped to pave the way for this third wave of democracy (Yilmaz 94).
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The new classic starting point for the modernization approach is Lipset’s essay
“Economic Development and Democracy” in his 1960 book Political Man. Essentially,
he said that democracy depends on a country’s socioeconomic development and level of
modernization. In a comparison of countries, looking at wealth, extent of
industrialization, degree of urbanization, and level of education, Lipset found that the
more democratic countries consistently had higher levels of socioeconomic development
than authoritarian countries (Potter 1997, 11).
Lipset also acknowledged that he was establishing correlation and not causation.
While he found that countries that were democratic had higher levels of socioeconomic
development, he recognized that it was not the same as saying that democracy is caused
by socioeconomic development. Lipset did discuss many causal mechanisms that could
have linked socioeconomic status and democracies. He found that economic development
and widespread higher education determines the form of the class struggle, which allows
those in lower strata to develop more complex political perspectives. Lipset argued that
higher socioeconomic development also strengthens the middle class, and larger middle
classes are good for democracy because they reward more moderate groups while
penalizing extremist groups (Potter 1997, 11-13). Lipset’s biggest causal mechanism was
increased education as he said that education “presumably broadens man’s [sic] outlook,
enables him to understand the need for norms of tolerance, restrains him from adhering to
extremist doctrines, and increases his capacity to make rational electoral choices” (Lipset
1960, 39). His actual causal mechanisms however, were simply suggestions of what
might explain correlations they were not systematically linked with his correlations
(Potter 1997, 13).
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Modernization Factors Working Together
Within modernization these three factors interact with each other in many
different ways. For example, many modern nation-states are dependent on a successful
capitalist economy so they adapt to different commercial or industrial conditions. Nationstates also adjust to new technologies while technologies adjust to the needs of nationstates (Cohen 2006). Likewise, economic development and industrialization often bring
about urbanization, specialization, and formal education in societies, as well as political
participation, which are all important parts of modernization. They also tend to bring
about development in communication. All of these factors are can be linked with further
cultural, social, and political changes (Inglehart 1997, 7-8).
Lipset argued that modernization often generates beliefs and creates values that
are conducive to democracy. Lipset knew that social conditions could have a major
impact on political changes like democratization as they could “nurture” the orientations
that lead to these political changes. While the data was not there to test his theory in
Lipset’s day, Samuel Huntington followed a very similar reasoning 30 years later.
Huntington argued that the rise of a modern middle class in developing countries helped
to lead to the belief that dictatorships were illegitimate, that when accompanied by
growing freedom the change in the orientations of the masses actually provides a major
asset to democratization (Welzel and Inglehart, 2009, 140).

Modernization Indicators
There are many indicators that can be used to track modernization. In the
following chapters, I will use the following economic, social, and political indicators to
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present Spain’s modernization path since 1939. For Lerner (1958) the most important
indicators were urbanization, education, and media growth/communication. Lipset (1959)
generally used the same indicators as Lerner, but also argued that economic development
involving industrialization was an important factor (Arat 1988, 22). Marsh added that life
expectancy, and in more recent years, cell phones and land phones per capita are good
measures of modernization (Marsh 2014, 264). Tipps (1973) saw modernization as a
series of transitions from primitive and subsistence economies to more technologyintensive industrialized economies, from subject to participant political cultures, from
closed to open achievement-oriented systems, from extended to nuclear family units, and
from religious to secular ideologies (Tipps 1973, 204).
Lipset (1959) argued that economic development, specifically involving
industrialization was one of the most important factors in modernization (Arat 1988, 22).
Typically, industrialization moved societies from a more rural agrarian society to an
urban society (Payne 1993, 24). In a modern state there is typically a growth in service
employment as well as a move to more technology-intensive economies (Payne 1993, 24;
Tipps 1973, 204). As a country modernizes there is often a steady increase in overall
wealth, and countries often move from a more closed to a more open economy (Arat
1988, 22; Tipps 1973, 204). Another indicator of economic growth is an increase in
transportation and communication as well as an increase in the modern household
technology of the time per capita. For example, measuring modernization in the 2010s it
would be useful to look at cell phones per capita (Payne 1993, 24; Marsh 2014, 264).
As Lerner (1958) and Lipset (1959) pointed out, urbanization is an essential social
factor contributing to modernization (Arat 1988, 22). Payne (1993) agreed, maintaining
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that modernization typically involved a heavy expansion moving from a more rural
society to an urban society, which typically accompanies industrialization. Education
improvements, including improved literacy rates, and number of students in universities
are also considered essential to modernization as they increase the social and political
consciousness of the masses (Payne 1993, 24; Arat 1988, 22). Another indicator of social
modernity can be opportunities for women, which can be measured by women in the
labor force and percentage of women university students (Payne 1993, 24). Another way
to measure social modernization is to look at family units. As nations modernize they
often move from large extended family units, to smaller family units, and birth rates often
decrease. Modern states are also often much more secular (Tipps 1973, 204).
In order to measure political modernization, a useful indicator would be moving
from a more subject to a more participant political culture (Tipps 1973, 204). While
modernization does not have to mean democracy specifically, a good indicator is citizens
that are more attuned to democratization (Payne 1993, 24). Media and communication
growth can be a good indicator of political modernization if they are more open and
controlled by sources outside the government (Arat 1988, 22). Another indicator of
political modernization is simply a higher level of political consciousness (Payne 1993,
24).
I will be using the majority of these factors to present Spain’s modernization path
from 1939, when the Spanish Civil War ended, until the present. I will measure Spain’s
economic modernization by assessing its industrialization process and looking at how
tech-intensive industry is, as well as looking at the amount of the workforce in involved
in the service industry, versus how much of the workforce is still involved in agriculture.
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I will also measure the increase in overall wealth looking at GDP per capita (and
accounting for inflation), as well as assessing the amount of ‘modern household
technology’ per capita based on the technology that was relevant at each different point in
time that I assess. I will also take into account how open the economy is, based on trade.
Additionally, I will look at the potential increase in transportation and communication.
I will present the story of Spain’s social and cultural modernization through
indicators like movement from a rural society to an urban society. I will look at education
improvements, by looking for an improvement in literacy rates, and more students
attending universities. I will also assess improvement in women’s opportunities, looking
at the percentage of women in the workforce as well as women involved in higher
education. I will look at family size, assessing birth rates as well as whether families are
more extended or more nuclear. Finally, I will measure church attendance in order to
gage the secularism of the nation.
It will require fewer indicators to present political modernization. I will look at
degree of democratization over time. I will measure citizens’ openness to democracy as
well as assess the political participation of the people in Spain over time to see if it moves
from a more subject to a more participant political culture. I will also look at censorship
and the media to see how much of it is controlled by the government in order to assess
government control over the nation.
Using all of these indicators I will attempt to put together a picture of the
modernization process of Spain. I will compare the timing of the different factors and I
will attempt to discover if what factor came first, economic modernization, political
modernization, or social modernization and how they are all connected.
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CHAPTER 3: A BRIEF HISTORY OF SPAIN

In order to evaluate the current modernity of Spain, it is crucial to understand
Spain’s complicated modernization history. Over the course of less than a century, Spain
underwent many political regime changes, modernized, reverted to a more traditional
state, and modernized again. From a dictatorship to a republic to another dictatorship to
its current democratic state, Spain changed dramatically over the course of the twentieth
century (Ross 2000; Tusell 2011). Understanding the process of change and the
influences on twentieth century Spain will help to analyze Spain today as a modern state.

Pre-Civil War and the Second Republic
From 1923 to 1930 Spain was under the control of the Primo de Rivera
dictatorship. Under his leadership Spain saw struggled with political reform but saw
considerable economic development, rapid industrialization as well as expanded national
and state income, which allowed the regime to begin a large public works program,
creating Spain’s modern highway system, and thus promoting further economic growth.
The Rivera dictatorship also placed high importance on having close relations with the
Catholic Church. Despite economic growth, as the Great Depression began, people
became discontented with the government, and Spain saw the growth of leftist and
republican, (those who supported a Spanish Republic as a form of government) parties.
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Rivera resigned at the request of the King Alfonso XIII, after losing support of the
military (Payne 1993, 20-22).
After about 1925, in the wake of the failing dictatorship, there was a rise in
support for a republic in Spain. By 1930, with the economic depression, and the fall of
the peseta, the Catalan bourgeoisie withdrew all support and Spain’s university students
began to launch a vocal opposition. Finally, the dictatorship lost support of the military.
Republicanism in Spain saw significant expansion, assisted unwittingly by the
dictatorship, through propaganda discrediting monarchist parliamentary parties, and
creating a strong opposition to authoritarian rule and the monarchy’s association with it.
A temporary government replaced the dictatorship in 1930. While Alfonso XIII hoped to
go back to the parliamentary system from before the Rivera dictatorship, the King was
unable to disassociate himself from the previous authoritarian state (Payne 1993, 22, 25).
After conspiracies and military risings, the King left and the Provisional Government of
the Republic took over in April of 1931. With the support of the socialists, Azaña became
the prime minister (Carr 1971, 3).
Culturally, prior to the Second Republic, and in the beginning years of the
Republic, Spain saw many “modern” changes. Spain saw major improvements in
education with adult illiteracy falling by almost 9%, a large improvement, during the
1920s (Payne 1993, 24). Likewise, the number of students in universities nearly doubled
between 1923 and 1930. Spain also saw, the beginnings of limited regional autonomy and
increased opportunities for women (Payne 1993, 24; 100; 105). Throughout the 1920s the
proportion of women in the labor force increased almost 9%, while the percentage of
university students who were women nearly doubled going from 4.79% to 8.3% between
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1923 and 1927. Despite being still relatively underdeveloped Spain was becoming more
“modern” through bettering education, increasing urbanization and becoming more
attuned to democratization (Payne 1993, 24).
With the social and economic changes, much of Spain saw an increase in political
consciousness that stemmed from strong leadership and an ability to organize, that
accompanied rising expectations for industrial and farm workers. As the country began to
modernize through better education, and urbanization, many citizens began to be more
politically conscious (Payne 1993, 24-25). The Republic brought about intense changes.
The Republican groups wanted to “remold major aspects of society, culture, and national
institutions” (Payne 1993, 81). They wanted to expand education, reform and modernize
the armed forces, provide regional autonomy, offer labor reforms, and offer an agrarian
reform to benefit landless farm laborers. They also wanted to separate church and state
and restrict the influence of the Catholic Church. They introduced the arrangement of
civil marriage as well as civil divorce and attempted to build an entirely secular state
education system (Payne 1993, 81-82).
In the long run, these reforms would essentially eliminate Catholic schools. At the
time most, left republicans and socialists felt that Catholics hindered progress and that
they were enemies of the Republic by nature so they weren’t alienating anyone with these
reforms. However, with these reforms they gained little financial reward for the
government but managed to outrage millions of Catholics. Additionally, while claiming
to work for civil rights, they completely disregarded religious freedoms (Payne 1993, 8283). These reforms, taking place between 1931 and 1933, proved to be successful at the
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time but in many cases, they proved to be ultimately counterproductive as they alienated
many citizens (Payne 1993, 124).
While the Republic was in full swing, the political right spent two and a half years
reorganizing. The four main categories of the realignment of the right included political
Catholicism, monarchist forces, reorganization of militant new business interests, and a
new fascist movement. The most important was the mass political Catholicism, which
had not been achieved in modern history (Payne 1993, 166).
The Second Republic failed, eventually losing the civil war. This failure was
brought about by a number of structural, ‘conjunctural’, and political problems. Socially
and economically, the country was modernizing too rapidly for the good of the people,
leaving two million landless farmworkers and their families to deal with the rapid
modernization of the country (Payne 1993, 373). Similarly, in the urban setting, four
million urban workers in industry and services faced poor living conditions due to low
wages and limited productivity. While the rapid economic expansion of the 1920s set the
Republic up on a positive note, it was unable to maintain the same intensity of expansion.
The expansion of literacy combined with economic expansion had left Spain a more
politically conscious society who was seeking even more rapid change that was simply
not possible. Politically different regions modernized at different rates, creating
significantly different modern regional nationalism, which lead to both political and
social divisions among regions (Payne 1993, 373-374).
One of the biggest problems was that many of the Republican leaders did not pay
attention to the realities of Spanish society, ignoring the interests of conservatives,
especially of the still popular Catholicism, as well as ignoring the potential of
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revolutionary extremism, and as a result misrepresented the population as a whole in the
Constitution (Payne 1993, 377-378). Adding flames to the fire, Azaña did not have a
great political ability and misread the proceeding history, interpreting the need for a
radical policy. Unfortunately for the second republic, its leaders accidentally facilitated
much of the work of the enemies of the republic through grave miscalculations (Payne
1993, 384).

The Spanish Civil War 1936-1939
The specifics of the actual Civil War are not as important to the understanding of
the modernity of Spain as those events leading up to it as well as following it. It is more
important to understand the general sentiment of the Civil War. In October of 1936,
General Franco was named the generalissimo, placing him in a position of great power
(Carr 1971, 111). Franco essentially came to power by default as most of the other major
Nationalist commanding officers had been killed in the beginning of the uprising. There
was one other general, Emilio Mola, who could have challenged him, but Franco had
been more successful in battle and so Mola was forced to concede to Franco (Arango
1985, 73). The two sides were represented by the Loyalists/the Republicans who were
defending the Second Republic, and the Nationalist rebels who wanted to overthrow it.
The War began with an uprising of Nationalist military generals in Morocco on July 17,
1936, triggered by the murder of a right-wing leader, José Calvo Sotelo. He was killed in
retaliation for the murder of a pro-Republican Assault Guard officer by three antiRepublican Falangists (Arango 1985, 64-65).
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The Republicans struggled throughout the war with conflict amongst their
leadership as they attempted to have seven leaders, coming from different left-wing
political parties (a Syndicalist, an Anarchist, two Communists, and three Socialists), who
all fought for power. They also enjoyed the support of the Catalan and Basque
nationalists. Another struggle the Republicans faced throughout the war was a lack of a
sufficient army. The majority of the national armed forces had gone to the side of the
rebel Nationalists. For a time, the Republicans received aid from the USSR. However
eventually, when the Soviet’s realized that the Republican government was not going to
be of great use for them in spreading their ideology across Europe, they withdrew their
aid. Once the Soviet’s withdrew their support, it became clear that the rebels were going
to succeed (Arango 1985, 64-67).
While there was still division in the rebel camp, the leadership was much more
unified with the goal of overthrowing the Republican regime. When the Nationalists
rebelled, they had not intended on a full-fledged civil war. They had intended to launch a
short attack, assuming that the Republican government would surrender quickly. The
Nationalist forces were lucky to have the support of the majority of military leadership,
the monarchists, the Catholic Church, large-scale landowners, powerful business
interests, the aristocracy, and the Falange, all of whom wanted a traditional and united
Spain (Arango 1985, 67-69).
It is impossible to know exactly why the Rebels won the war, but the common
ideologies definitely helped the Nationalist side. Many of the leftist Loyalists, were not
traditionally Spanish and came from other parts of the world, like Soviet Communism.
Additionally, many of the different forces in the war worked to pull Spain apart, rather
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than unify it. In contrast, the Republican side wanted a unified and ordered Spain,
featuring nationalism and Catholicism. Even some regionalists chose to support their
religion over their autonomy (Arango 1985, 69-70). After three years of fighting
between the Republican forces and the more tactically trained Nationalist forces, the
Civil War officially ended on April 1st of 1939, placing Franco in power (Car 1971, 111).

The Beginning of the Franco Dictatorship
Javier Tusell presented the Franco dictatorship well when he explained Franco’s
ceremony after earning the Grand Cross Laureate of San Fernando, Spain’s highest
military honor, “The entire ceremony, which more properly belonged to a medieval
warrior society in which military, political, and religious life were bound together, largely
explains what happened after 1939” (Tusell 2011, 1). Franco ruled Spain for more than
three decades and his regime changed in its own way with the times and with outside
pressures. Throughout the first half of his leadership Franco was generally inspired by
Spain’s past. He was attempting to preserve a past Spain by isolating the nation, but he
was also trying to build Spain’s economy and increase its power. The Franco dictatorship
is full of contradictions as Franco tried to both inhibit and embrace modernization in
different aspects of society (Ross 2000, 95).
Politically, after taking power Franco essentially continued the way the
Nationalist zones had been governed during the war period. He ruled in the top-down
leadership style of the war, serving as the Head of State, the Head of Government, and
the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. He crushed his enemies, who in his eyes
were just as much Spain’s enemies as his own personal enemies, through violence (Ross
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2000, 95-96). “Tens of thousands of Republican sympathizers were shot”, while many
more were sentenced to generally lengthy prison sentences, even at the end of his regime,
those left suffered systematic discrimination (Ross 2000, 96). The policies of the Franco
regime favored those who had supported it during the 1936 revolt, specifically large
landowners and financiers whereas industrial workers found themselves with their wages
held down, lacking basic freedoms, and facing banned trade unions. Franco also made a
point to “stamp out any notion of regional distinctiveness” in a nationalist attempt to
unify Spain (Ross 2000, 96).
Politically Franco gave the Falange, the Spanish fascist party, an important role in
his regime, making the emblem a popular symbol and adopting the motto of the Falange
founder (José Antonio Primo de Rivera) “Spain; One, Great, Free” (Ross 2000, 97). It
was not until he realized that Western democracies were going to prevail in the Second
World War that he started to downplay the fascist elements of the regime and introduce
elements of “democracy” although they were simply cosmetic (Ross 2000, 98). Franco
discovered the importance of the mere appearance of institutional change so he sought
approval for constitutional measures that would not in any way actually interfere with his
own power. After 1944 he aimed to have a more democratic appearance so he allowed
union elections in 1945 and promised that municipal elections would follow (Tusell
2011, 58-59).
One of Franco’s most important tactical decisions was adopting a Catholic stance
in his political actions. Franco was able to count on the support of the Catholic
associations that had been there from the early days of the regime. National Catholicism
was a doctrine that linked together all of the sections of the Spanish right, linking religion
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and nationalism with the political regime (Tusell 2011, 59). By the 1950s the most
powerful influence in the regime was the Catholic Church, which described its
philosophy as Catholic Nationalism, although it was still subordinate to Franco (Ross
2000, 101). Catholic Nationalism was one of the leading philosophies of the era and
could be described as “a way of looking at life” rather than just a political theory (Tusell
2011, 29). It was a reaction to the passive faith of the past, aiming to re-conquer society.
It was characterized as anti-modern, intolerant, and relied on mixing politics and the
faith, aiming to gain complete control for the Catholic Church (Tusell 2011, 29). National
Catholicism managed to link together, religion, nationalism, and the political regime
through a common sentiment shared across the Spanish right (Tusell 2011, 59).
The Falange became increasingly unpopular and in 1945, as the Falange was
removed from the spotlight, The Primary Education Law was passed ensuring the early
education would be entirely Catholic. Additionally, following the fall of the Falange was
The Spaniards’ Charter of Rights, which was essentially just a list of rights that never
actually turned into laws. There was also a weak attempt by The Local Government Law
to represent a wider range of interests in town halls but it also did not really do anything.
There was no real change in the state control of the media except that it now went
through the Ministry of Education rather than the Falange, thus it went through members
of the Catholic establishment (Tusell 2011, 61). When Franco presented the Spanish
Charter in 1945, he tried to separate the regime from the idea of totalitarianism using the
term “organic democracy” (Ross 2000, 99). The idea of organic democracy stemmed
from the idea that citizens would be best represented by bodies in society, like the
government-controlled trade unions, the church, and the male head of the family, rather
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than political parties (Ross 2000, 99). Essentially it simply consolidated censorship and
the denial of basic rights, while confirming the ban on political parties. Through the first
half of his dictatorship Franco kept the military as a strong political and social influence
and kept military presence in his cabinets (Ross 2000, 99-100).
In 1958, signaling some of the changes that would accompany the second half of
his Regime, Franco adopted the “National Movement” as the title as his party, and
created the “Principles of the National Movement Act.” It effectively changed nothing,
and demonstrated that, nothing had really changed for Franco. But by moving
economically into the world community and accepting help, Franco was no longer able to
completely decide Spain’s fate (Ross 2000, 105).

The Later Years of the Franco Dictatorship (1959-1975)
More details on the end of the dictatorship will be given in later chapters, as the
process of modernization in Spain essentially began during the second half of the Franco
regime. Essentially, when the economy was suffering, Franco’s only choice to avoid
falling into the depths of the qualifications of a ‘third world’ country was to open up the
economy. The opening up of the economy increased the interactions of Spanish citizens
with the outside world and triggered social changes, which were soon followed by
political changes (Arango 1985; Tusell 2011).
The cultural, economic, and political changes of the second part of the Franco
regime were all co-dependent. The economic success of the 1950s triggered social
changes that didn’t fit very well with the slow pace of the regime’s political change. With
a rise in prosperity came an increased access to goods like television sets and cars, which
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appeared to create a sort of indifference rather than the resentment of the past towards the
government, while they did not always necessarily agree with it, citizens did not seem to
want to risk losing their newfound possessions (Ross 2000, 110-112). However, even
with new economic development, they were not accepted into the European Economic
Community in 1962 because they really were not a democracy, further illustrating the gap
between political and economic development (Ross 2000, 113).

The Transition to Democracy (1975-1978)
Early on in the dictatorship, Don Juan, a Spanish royal, and the rightful King, had
made a deal with Franco that Don Juan’s son Juan Carlos would be educated based on
Franco’s specifications in order to be prepared be Franco’s heir (Ross 101). Thanks to
this education, Juan Carlos was fully prepared to take the throne after Franco’s death.
However, when Juan Carlos I came to the throne in 1975, the power remained partially in
the hands of the same conservatives who had enjoyed great influence and power during
the dictator’s last years (Ross 2000, 123). That said, the pressures for change had been
building and it was evident that something had to change and soon (Ross 2000, 123).
Juan Carlos said in his investiture speech that he wanted the opening up of Spain
and that he wanted democratization. He had some liberalizers in his cabinet but was still
inhibited by a number of Franco’s die-hard supporters. When Juan Carlos came to power,
he was unable to simply remove those who were left over from the previous regime, as he
could not risk alienating either side of the political spectrum if he wanted to have a
peaceful transition to democracy. Carlos Arias Navarro the prime minister from 19731976 was more liberalizing but hoped for a distinctively Spanish democracy based on the
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ideas that Franco had come up with but never truly put into action. He took some steps in
the direction of political reform by pardoning some political prisoners and offering a
vague commitment to changes in the future but did not accomplish much (Ross 2000,
124). What he did accomplish was the beginning of operation of political parties; while
they were still officially banned, restrictions were loosened and they were essentially
allowed to operate unofficially. Parliament rejected his plan to legalize political parties,
and he resigned (Ross 2000, 124-125).
Juan Carlos surprised the nation in 1976 by appointing Adolfo Suárez, a senior
Francoist bureaucrat, with valuable insights, as Prime Minister. Suárez’s appointment
marked the true beginning of the transition to democracy. His selection was surprising as
Adolfo Suárez had was not a particularly prominent politician and had been a cabinet
minister under Franco and was associated with continuismo, which was a liberalization
idea that essentially meant democratization without democracy. He surprised the nation
by being extremely open to democracy (Arango 1985, 96-97). He began to extend basic
liberties like the freedom of assembly and association, which lessened tension as he
announced his plan for political liberalization. He proposed a Political Reform Bill,
which proposed a two-chamber Parliament that was fully elected, and the legalization of
parties. However, it wasn’t until 1978 that Spain had a democratic constitution, which
brought the transition to democracy to an official close (Ross 2000, 125-130).

Spain After the Transition to Democracy
Spain was welcomed into the European Union in 1986, further solidifying their
transition into a modern European State. While the accession into the European Union
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had numerous benefits at first, some of the initial benefits wore off by the 1990s, leaving
Spain with some economic difficulties. Spain has also been plagued in recent years with
high rates of unemployment. Since the transition Spain has also seen a wide variety of
political movements and parties, some of the most notable in recent years are the
regionalist movements. While the Constitution of 1978, was intended to incorporate and
acknowledge the different cultures and traditions of the different Autonomous regions in
Spain, in some ways it actually helped to increase separatist sentiment, by allowing
regions to have their own form of government, especially in Catalonia. Overall however,
Spain seems to fit right in with the rest of the European Union (Ross 2000, 140-153).
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CHAPTER 4: ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION

Towards the end of the Franco regime Spain began to undergo its own process of
modernization. In Spain’s case, modernization seemed to have begun with economic
factors. In the second half of the 1960s Franco began to loosen his grips on the Spain ever
so slightly, opening up the economy. The economic growth that the country saw seemed
to bring about social change that made the regime less authoritarian. Spain was actually
behind many Latin American countries in terms of economic and social development
during the 1950s, but by Franco’s death, it had almost moved up to the same level of the
rest of Europe (Tusell 2011, 187; 197).
Spain’s economic transformation is often referred to as the “Spanish Economic
Miracle”. Until the 1960s Spain was considered a poor country and 48 percent of its
population was living from subsistence level agriculture. Most developing nations strive
to build a solid middle class, which often accompanies the industrial revolution, whereas
the industrial revolution did not even really reach Spain until the 1960s. Spain had a bit
of wide scale manufacturing in Catalonia and the Basque provinces but the majority of
the economy was agriculture based. Spain had a tradition of autarky and for years, heavy
import duties kept out competing goods and services as well as modern technology that
could have easily transformed the Spanish economy, and with it the Spanish society.
There was a little bit of foreign investment in Spain but the majority of the Spanish
people did not reap any of the benefits of foreign investment. During Primo de Rivera’s
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regime the state actively pursued isolationism, a tradition that continued for many years
(Arango 1985, 187-188).

Economic Change During the Franco Regime
The economy during first half of the Franco regime was marked by isolationism
(Tusell 2011, 103). The Civil War devastated the Spanish economy, and by the end of
World War II, Spain was faced with no choice other than isolationism. Europe as a whole
needed to rebuild, and the Allies generally excluded the Franco regime from the political,
social, and economic organizations that they were creating (Arango 1985, 190-191). As
Western powers began to settle into their roles after the end of the Second World War it
became clear that they were not going to forcefully overthrow Franco. However, they
were able to impose isolation on the regime. Spain was not allowed into the United
Nations and most countries withdrew their ambassadors from Spain (Tusell 2011, 103).
As Arango puts it, “Franco embraced autarky because he had no other alternative, but in
doing so he followed a Spanish tradition that was already half a century old” (Arango
1985, 191). Franco more or less pursued the economic policies of Spain before the Civil
War, regulating domestic production and exports and imports, applying currency
restrictions, rationing consumer goods and fixing prices, and employing the state for
reconstruction in the postwar era, where private capital was not enough (Arango 1985,
191-193).
Isolationism worked in Spain for a time, but eventually it was unable to keep pace
with the rest of Europe and Franco had to make a change, or risk Spain falling into what
later became known as “The Third World” (Arango 1985, 191-193). As the economic
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state began to threaten the regimes stability, although he had avoided help from the
United States, Franco was unable to pass up an agreement with the United States. In 1953
Spain’s isolation finally ended when they entered into a series of Defense Agreements,
and the United States agreed to support Spain, which helped them get admitted to the
United Nations in 1955 (Arango 1985, 193-194; Tusell 103).
Franco also accepted financial support from the United States, which boosted the
Spanish economy going along with the upswing in the world economy throughout the
1950s. The economy also saw growth as the regime slightly relaxed some of its trade
restrictions in the middle of the decade. These things, alongside state promoted
industrialization helped the country to grow and finally surpass pre-war levels. As the
economy grew, living standards rose especially for the small but growing middle class
(Ross 2000, 103-104). However, the U.S. funds could only provide so much relief, and it
soon became clear that a more thorough and continued economic change was the only
way to get the recent economic relief to last (Arango 1985, 193-194).
Economic growth aside, the largest strike wave of the time happened in 1956,
causing incredible inflation, which had a disastrous effect on the economy. This increased
differences between different sectors of the economy and reduced the competitiveness of
Spanish goods in the world market. This increased the import bill, and widened the trade
gap, which Spain’s exports were not able to close. As the situation worsened, the United
States was afraid that Spain would not be able to pay its debts so they influenced the
International Monetary Fund and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation
to assist Spain. Luckily for Spain, both agencies provided further loans. However, these
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loans came only with changes in economic policy, Spain had to abolish the system it had
used to restrict imports of multiple exchange rates (Ross 2000, 104).
The economy saw a lot of development during this second period of Franco’s
regime. Economic control was handed over to members of the Opus Dei, which felt that a
Catholic regime could only survive if the desire for better living standards were met.
They felt that economic growth was necessary but that it was “best achieved by allowing
marked forces free rein through the ending of government intervention in the economy”
(Ross 2000, 110). Although they advocated for free market forces, they preferred strong
control over society so that it wouldn’t become secular and liberal as many other Western
countries had. The technocrats of the Opus Dei were given an essentially free hand over
all economic strategy. There was this desire to maintain control over the culture and
society of Spain, while allowing for economic freedom, something that would prove very
difficult to do (Ross 2000, 110).
When Franco handed over economic power to the technocrats of the Opus Dei, he
gave them more or less free reign and they created the Stabilization Plan of 1959, which
was supposed to prepare Spain for trade with the outside world. Rumor has it when
Franco gave the power to the Opus Dei he said, “Hagan lo que les gana,” which means,
“Do whatever you wish”. But as Arango pointed out “A more idiomatic translation would
reveal Franco’s impatience and frustration, forced into a policy that he did not like, that
he knew he could not freely control once it was engaged, but that he could not avoid
unless he were willing to settle for the pauperization of Spain: ‘Do whatever you damn
well feel like doing’” (Arango, 1985, 194). Essentially the Stabilization plan reduced the
easy supply of money for entrepreneurs and increased the costs of goods and services,
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which reduced purchasing power. It restricted the expansion of private bank credit, raised
the rates charged by the national railway (which was state-owned), increased the cost of
telephone service, devalued the peseta and upped the price of lubricants, petroleum
products, and tobacco. All of this prepared Spain for foreign investment (Arango 1985,
194).
Their strategy involved deflationary measures and the opening up of Spain’s
economy. They loosened controls on inward investment and allowed foreign capital to
have a controlling stake in companies that were not too politically sensitive. One of the
most influential things they did was ease the restrictions on the movement of people,
promoting tourism and encouraging Spaniards to seek work outside of Spain. Investment
began to pour into the country due to low production costs and Spain began the full
process of industrialization. Tourism took off, with Spain quickly becoming the lead
provider of beach vacations. Economic growth made up for Spain’s trade deficit and
Spain saw a decline of agriculture and a massive depopulation of the countryside (Ross
2000, 110-112).
The downside of the stabilization plan is that it caused an economic recession,
production fell, consumer demand decreased, and many weak firms went out of business.
Unemployment increased and imports fell. However, as the cost of Spanish goods fell,
exports rose and the balance of payments improved, offering Spain foreign exchange
(Arango 1985, 194). Lieberman (1982) explained the effects of the Stabilization Plan best
when he said:
“The Stabilization Plan of 1959 also stimulated economic growth through two major effects.
By bringing the economy closer to a market system and by exposing Spanish firms to foreign
competition, the Plan confronted domestic inefficient firms with a choice between increasing
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their productive efficiency or having to face probable business failure. It thus induced many
firms to modernize their methods of production and to develop new products. By liberalizing
foreign trade and by opening up the economy to foreign investment the Plan allowed Spain to
benefit from its geographical proximity to the rapidly developing economy of Western
Europe” (Lieberman 1982, 215).

Spain was now ready for the economic takeoff of the 1960s. However, while the
International Bank of Reconstruction and Development recommended a free market
economy, at the time the Economic elite who supported Franco would not have tolerated
a free market economy and the Opus Dei had to come up with another method (Arango
1985, 195).
The Opus Dei began a process of ‘indicative planning’ between both state and
private enterprise. Private enterprise was not forced to follow the scheme but doing so
meant benefits like tax advantages, and special lines of credit. They encouraged private
investment in areas that needed development and eventually the INI was able to help
concentrate on more long rage activities. Finally beginning in the 1960s Spain saw the
economic growth it had been dreaming of (Arango 1985, 195-196).
In the space of only a single generation Spain underwent a transformation greater
than any transformation in the previous century. The working population became less
traditional, with 40 percent of the working population in the service sector, 38 percent
working in industry, and only 22 percent in agriculture, which was still more than many
countries but significantly less than before. Spain saw a 287 percent increase in industrial
wages between 1964 and 1972, while cost of living only increased by 70%. Average
income in Spain rose from $300 in 1960 to $2,000 in 1973, catching up to other European
countries. In the late 60s and early 70s economic growth helped increase the number of
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cars, telephones, televisions, refrigerators, and washing machines in households. By
1968, the percentage of households that had a fridge, a television, and a washing machine
was 40 percent and that number rose to include between 60 and 80% of households with
all of these items. The economic takeoff in Spain created a new middle class consisting of
office workers, sales people and technicians who increased consumption (Tusell 2011,
198-199).
The cultural, economic, and political changes of the second part of the Franco
regime were all co-dependent. The economic success of the 1950s triggered social
changes that didn’t fit very well with the slow pace of the regime’s political change. With
a rise in prosperity came an increased access to goods like television sets and cars, which
created what might even be called apathy rather than the resentment of the past towards
the government, while they did not always necessarily agree with it, citizens didn’t want
to risk losing their newfound possessions (Ross 2000, 110-112). Between 1962 and 1966
the number of cars per inhabitant doubled, and the number of telephones increased by 50
percent. By the end of Franco’s regime Spain had gone from producing 250,000 cars per
year in 1966 to producing 700,000 cars in 1974. In 1966 Spain produced 570,000
television sets, 300,000 fridges, and about 400,000 washing machines. By 1974 Spain
was producing 730,000 television sets, more than a million fridges, and more than
800,000 washing machines. By Franco’s death in 1975 the number of households with a
fridge, a television, and a washing machine was about 60 percent whereas in 1968 it was
only 40 percent (Tusell 2011, 199).
Spain still faced a very large social inequality, which differentiated it from the rest
of Europe. Even at the end of the Franco period, 22 percent of the nation’s wealth was
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owned by 1.2 percent of the population and another 52 percent of the wealth was owned
by only 22 percent of the population. A more even distribution of wealth would
contribute to a larger middle class, which is a more modern structure (Tusell 2011, 200).

Economic Change in the Post-Franco Era
Unfortunately, this economic success didn’t last long. Spain saw many economic
problems in the 1980s that are reflective of the economic problems faced by the
industrialized world at that time. Spain saw high unemployment, and inflation and found
themselves too dependent on foreign energy sources and with a lack of domestic savings
and investment. The crisis was compounded by the fact that as Spain finally entered the
industrialized world, it became a consumer society. People finally had money to spend on
themselves and became less concerned with saving for the future. One of the biggest
problems they faced during this time was high unemployment, reaching 12.6% in 1980
whereas in 1974 it had been just 3.2% of the active labor force. And while Spain was
making major strides in women’s rights, with 29.2% of the working population being
women whereas in 1959, at the beginning of the economic miracle, only 20.1% of the
work force was women, the increasing size of the labor force heightened the
unemployment issue (Arango 1985, 197-202).
When the socialist government came to power in Spain, unemployment had
reached a high of over 15%, and the deficit was more than 5 percent of the GDP. The
PSOE hoped to create new jobs, provide direct investment, and create larger tax revenue.
Another goal was to reduce inflation, which actually decreased from 14 to 8 percent from
1982 to 1985. However, this caused unemployment to rise even more to 22% (Tusell
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2011, 340). Spain’s true economic recovery did not begin until 1994, during the time of
the last socialist government. Spain began to follow a policy that maintained
macroeconomic stability, lowered interest rates, and decreased the public deficit and debt,
which finally lead to some stability. Consumption and private investment and an
openness to the world helped Spain to finally reach stability. Spain finally began
exporting capital especially to Latin America, rather than receiving it. Liberalization and
privatization were also crucial factors in Spain’s new economic success (Tusell 2011,
412-413).

How Modern is the Spanish Economic System Today?
It would be impossible to deny that Spain’s economy has not undergone an
intense modernization process. The World Values Survey provides data that can give a
good idea of the economic state of Spain today. For example, between 2010 and 2014,
71% of people were involved in private business, whereas only 56% were involved in
private business from 2005-2009. This indicates the increase in private business in Spain
in recent years, which indicates a more open economy, something that is very modern.
Additionally, between 1994 and 2014, the majority of people described themselves as
either working class or lower middle class. A large middle class is a good indicator of a
modern economy, and especially between 2005 and 2014, the percent of people who
considered themselves lower middle class increased significantly to be well over the
majority of people. In fact, 68% of respondents considered themselves to be lower middle
class between 2010 and 2014, compared to only 25% from 1994 to 1998 (see table 4.1 for
details). In support of this, most respondents placed themselves between the third and
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seventh step on the income scale, supporting that Spain is a mostly middle-class country.
Between 1981 and 2014 the number of people in the higher income steps decreased
significantly balancing out the majority of respondents in the middle-class range (see
Table 4.2 for details).
Regarding the accumulation of wealth, another economic modernization factor,
more respondents erred on the side of “wealth can grow so there’s enough for everyone”
rather than feeling that “people can only get rich at the expense of others”. On a scale of
1 to 10, 1 being that “people can only get rich at the expense of others”, and 10 being that
“wealth can grow so there’s enough for everyone” most respondents were consistently in
the middle at 5, with the majority of the remaining respondents choosing higher than 5,
indicating that for Spaniards there is a fairly optimistic view of increasing wealth (see
Table 4.3 for details). That being said World Values Survey data indicates that Spaniards
in recent years are slightly less satisfied with the financial situation of their households.
The data shows a slight fluctuation, between 1981 and 2014 as the percentage of
respondents move mostly between a level of satisfaction of 5 and 8 out of 10, 1 being
dissatisfied, and 10 being satisfied. From 2005-2014 there was an increase in those who
only ranked their satisfaction with their financial situation as a 4 out of 10, being more
dissatisfied with their household financial situation than satisfied. Only 5% of
respondents ranked their level of satisfaction as a 4 out of 10 whereas in the 2005-2009
survey, 11% ranked their level of satisfaction as a 4 and in the 2010-2014 survey 12% of
respondents ranked their satisfaction as only a 4 out of 10. This shows an increase in the
number of respondents who were dissatisfied with their household financial situation (see
Table 4.4 for details). This could potentially be explained by the fact that, Spain’s
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unemployment rate has increased significantly from 5% in the period from 1981-1984 to
19% in the period from 2010-2014 (see Table 4.5 for details), which is also reflected in
the fact that 39% of those surveyed were worried about losing their job or not being able
to find a job.
Compared to Italy, over time, both countries saw a decline in satisfaction with the
financial situation of the household between 1981 and 2009. Both countries also had a
similar unemployment rate between 1981 and 2009. Both had relatively high percentages
of women who identified as housewives, without any other employment, which declined
over time, but Spain had a consistently higher percentage over time. However, while Italy
initially had many more people in the upper steps of the income scale in the period from
1981-1984, Spain had a higher number of “middle class” citizens in the fourth through
seventh income steps and was able to maintain them through the 2009 survey, while Italy
saw an increase in those in the lower steps, without seeing an increase in the middle class.
Likewise, in the period from 2005 to 2009, Spain had a much larger percent of those who
considered themselves to be upper or lower middle class (for detailed numbers see Table
4.6 and Graph 4.1) (World Values Survey).
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Graph 4.1
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Conclusion
Overall Spain scored a 3.4 out of 6 on the economic modernity score. This places
it second out of the six countries it was being compared with, as can be seen in Graph
4.1. Sweden was the only country that had a higher score, while Germany, the United
States, Japan, and Italy all lagged behind (see Table 4.7 for detailed numbers).
It is very clear that Spain has undergone an economic modernization. In the final
years of the Franco regime, Spain opened up its economy and allowed foreign influence,
investment, and technology to transform the economy from a rural agrarian economy, to
an industrialized one. While it faced some economic challenges, Spain overcame many of
them and shows many of the factors of economic modernity. It has witnessed an increase
in modern technology and overall wealth, and a rise in the middle class and an increase in
economic opportunities. Spain is also home to a healthy private sector. While they have
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recently seen a very high level of unemployment, the fluctuation of unemployment in
itself is part of a modern economy that does not rely entirely on government control.
Graph 4.2
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CHAPTER 5: SOCIAL AND CULTURAL MODERNIZATION

Throughout the dictatorship Spain saw a number of social and cultural changes.
While society during the first half of the Franco Regime remained very traditional and
centered around Catholic beliefs, Spain saw many social and cultural changes beginning
in the second half of his regime. As Spain was opened up to tourism, citizens began to
have more freedom, as it became harder to maintain the strict rules and censorship that
controlled the citizens. Spain faced an even larger cultural transition in the wake of
Franco’s death in 1975. The cultural changes in Spain throughout the twentieth century
give a good indication of the pace and intensity of the modernization process in Spain.

Society and Culture During the Beginning of the Dictatorship
Spanish Catholicism had managed to survive the persecution against religion that
had plagued it during the early twentieth century with the Second Republic. Franco
managed to bring Spain back to a society based on religion, something many
conservative citizens wanted. Catholicism was at the base of social and cultural values
across the nation, which made it very hard to shake (Payne 1984, 192). The culture under
Franco could be described as “Catholic antique” featuring ceremony and symbols
inspired by the great Catholic monarchs of yesteryear, like Isabella and Ferdinand,
Charles V, and Phillip II. The state was guided by Catholic morals and ethics and
controlled most aspects of society, including education, which was heavily shaped by the
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Catholic Church. Franco placed the highest importance on the Catholic Church, in fact he
mentioned that, “to the discipline and patriotism of the soldier must be added the faith
and fervor of the man of religion” (Palabras del Caudillo 1953, 317). Franco felt that the
foreign influences had corrupted Spanish society and aimed to bring Spain back to the
Golden Age in the 16th century. Franco once asked, “Doesn’t a century of defeat and
decadence demand a revolution? It does indeed—and a revolution in the Spanish sense
that will destroy an ignominious century of foreign-inspired doctrines that have caused
our death…In the name of liberty, fraternity, and equality and all such liberal trivia our
churches have been burned and our history destroyed” (Palabras del Caudillo 1953, 54).
After the Civil War, women’s roles regressed, especially professionally. The
traditional perspective in Spain at the time was that connected women to reproduction
and family life. Societies views is reflected in the words of popular magazines at the
time, “Where woman is at her most womanly is here, in Spain” and that the ideal is a
“Sweet, passive woman who waits for us, glimpsed behind a curtain, occupied with her
work and her prayers,” (Tusell 2011, 201). There was an idea that men could choose if
they wanted to get married or not but that if a woman did not get married it was because
she was unable to find a husband. Education between boys and girls was separate and
there was a women’s section of the Falange that trained girls in domestic skills (Tusell
2011, 201-202).
There was minimal cultural production during the Franco period due to intense
censorship. Most of the Spanish cultural creation that went on to achieve recognition was
produced by those who left Spain during the Civil War (or were already living abroad)
and did not come back during the Franco Regime. One of the greatest examples is Pablo
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Picasso. One Spanish writer, Federico García Lorca was denied fame during his time. He
was executed by the rebels early in the Civil War, showing that the “creative Spanish
Spirit” was not going to be tolerated thanks to the rebellion. During the regime, there was
no tolerance for any artistic activity that attacked the regime (Arango 1985, 208-209).
Culturally, although there was significant censorship, there was some degree of
personal and social freedom artistically. Generally, writers like Julián Marías, felt that
they could not say everything that they wanted to say but they could at least say some of
it, knowing that the most important novels of the time were censored (Tusell 2011, 93).
Franco promoted a number of different cultural projects such as rebuilding “Spain’s
capacity for scientific research” which was partially directed by a traditional and
clericalist right, which in itself seems a bit counterintuitive due to the tension that often is
experienced between the church and the science community. Additionally, the Falange
controlled the Spanish University Students’ Union as well as residential university
colleges so that it could have more impact on young citizens. Many of the newspaper
publications were dominated by propaganda (Tusell 2011, 93-96).
During this time Spain produced roughly 37 films per year, while cinema was still
entertaining it was seen as a “formidable weapon for disseminating ideas” (Tusell 2011,
101). Films with historical films also played an important role in “shaping the spirit of the
nation” which was important to the nationalist agenda (Tusell 2011, 101). The radio
remained very popular, with a state radio station to represent the party, although serial
radio programs were particularly popular. Unsurprisingly, there was also a huge quantity
of religious radio programming. The government used films and the radio in order to get
their agenda political and social across (Tusell 2011, 102). At this time, American films
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(and other foreign films) were particularly popular. However, the censors scrutinized
every detail of these films looking for anything that might be seen as inappropriate, for
example an exposed thigh or a glimpse of stocking, or anything against the regime. On
example is that in one movie, Mogombo, a character’s mistress was changed to his sister
in the dubbed version of the film, so that the suggestion of adultery was not present
(Arango 1985, 209-210).

Society and Culture during the End of the Dictatorship
During the 1950s and 1960s when Spain began to see economic change, it became
harder and harder to maintain the cultural values that Spain had clung to for so long. It
was still not possible to challenge or attack the faith, but that did not stop change from
coming. By opening up the Spanish economy, Spain saw social and cultural trends
brought about by industrialization and urbanization. As income increased, Spain saw
mass consumerism for roughly the first time, bringing out a society that was more attuned
to materialism and hedonism. And while the state continued to enforce censorship, many
new cultural influences began to enter Spain from foreign nations. There was mass
foreign tourism, and many Spaniards moved abroad exposing Spanish society to cultures
that were far from traditional. They also saw mass advertising and contemporary media
(Payne 1984, 192).
This newfound cultural change and freedom, deeply affected the Catholic Church
in Spain. However, for a time, Spain still had some of the highest levels of church
attendance in a Catholic country. In fact, a FOESSA sociological study in 1969 showed
that the average attendance of workers and employees was 34%, which was higher than
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many other nations in Northern Europe. Table 5.1 shows the church attendance by region
between 1965 and 1974, with the national average being 34.6% attending Sunday mass.
Attendance by young people did begin to drop off in the 1970s, which was a fitting
forecast of the future (Payne 1984, 211-212).
Table 5.1: Church Attendance by Region 1965-74
Region
Population attending
Sunday mass (%)
Andalusia
22.4
Aragon
61.2
Catalonia
21.7
Balearics
58.3
Canaries
22.4
New Castile
17.6
Old Castile & León
65.3
Extremadura
26.7
Galicia & Asturias
40.8
Valencia & Murcia
30.2
Basque Country & Navarre
71.3
National Average
34.6

One of the first ways that Spain began to visibly modernize was in terms of
population growth. The population increased between 1960 and 1970 from 30 million
people to over 33 million. The mortality rate changed to be more similar to the rate in
France and Italy. The birth rate also decreased, though it was significantly later than
many other societies, because birth control did not become widespread until after the
transition to democracy. In addition to population growth, Spain saw an abundance of
internal migrations. In the late 1960s, four million Spaniards changed where they lived,
the majority of who were landless laborers who moved to urban centers in search of work
or a new way of life. The Spanish population itself became more urbanized, as the
number of people living in towns with more than 20,000 people increased from 40
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percent to 54 percent. In 1970, nearly at the end of the Franco regime only 33 percent of
people lived in towns that had less than 10,000 people (Tusell 2011, 197). In 1970, the
average urban percent of the population in Europe and Central Asia was 60.8% and
Spain’s urban population was 66% (World Bank).
The three different aspects of modernization generally move at different paces
and at this point, Spain’s social changes lagged behind its economic changes. While
economic development was widespread in Spain, it did not necessarily reach all of the
population. This showed that the state politically did not know how to respond to the
social problems that Spain was facing. Up until 1970, Spain spent more money on the
army than on education. This was reflected in the huge deficiencies that were present in
Spanish education; many students who were school age did not attend classes (Tusell
2011, 200).
However not all of the social aspects of Spanish society lagged as much.
Universities did increase enrollment, and the number of teachers in Spain increased by 66
percent putting them on a better track. Likewise, after 1970 Spain did begin to spend
more on education than the army. The housing demand also grew significantly in Spain,
both an economic and social change. The Armed services also became more progressive,
as the mentality of the younger officers changed. More than half of officers from the
Military Academy at Zaragoza, surveyed in 1975 felt that the religious parts of military
ceremonies were inappropriate. The 1970s showed a large gap between the older high
command in the Armed Services and the lower younger officers. That being said, the
military was still highly traditional and four cadets were expelled from the Zaragoza
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Military Academy in 1973 for “reading dissident publications…for having university
friends, or for having renounced their Catholic Faith” (Tusell 2011, 201).
Women did see a number of changes in the 1950s and especially in the 1960s.
The 1958 reform of the Civil Code partially declared the roles of men and women in
marriage equal. In 1950 women only represented 15 percent of the working population
but by the end of Franco’s regime they represented 28 percent. That being said, a
majority of women’s involvement in the workforce was represented in domestic service.
Women faced both progress and limitations. Many university graduates in the 1960s felt
that it was normal for women to work but in 1975, the year Franco died, 80 percent of the
population still felt that a woman’s place was in the home (Tusell 2011, 201-202).
Additionally, a rise in urban populations created a new wider range of experiences
especially for young people (Ross 2000, 110-112). These new opportunities and
experiences seemed to make many younger citizens resentful of, or at least less respectful
towards the “strict Catholic morality” that accompanied the Franco regime (Ross 2000,
112). As the economy opened up tourism and emigration increased allowing more
Spaniards to come into contact with the outside world and understand that life in other
Western countries did not necessarily fit with the Spanish propaganda. Generally, these
other cultures appeared to have higher standards of living and more freedom (Ross 2000,
112). Another key example of the slowly broadening cultural opportunities is that under
the control of the more liberal Information Minister Pío Cabanillas, pornography
appeared in Spanish bookshops (Ross 2000, 119).
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Society and Culture in Post-Franco Spain
Even in 1985, just ten years after Franco’s death, the changes in Spanish culture
and society were undeniable. As Arango put it, Spaniards could “legally divorce, have
abortions, smoke dope, swim naked at the beach, and openly indulge in their most
elaborate sexual fantasies, with pornography available at kiosks, bookshops, movie
houses, and live theatres” (Arango 1985, 205). Mainstream newspapers, even the
prestigious El País even began carrying advertisements for “boys and girls available for
men and women in whatever combination tastes demand” (Arango 1985, 205). During
Franco’s time sex and politics were some of the greatest taboos, and aside from the fact
that politics were finally allowed wherever, these examples illustrate just how far Spain
had already come from an ultra-conservative, country under Franco (Arango 1985, 205).
Spain today has a significant amount of cultural output. It has many famous
museums like the Prado and the Reina Sofia in Madrid, that are now filled with art,
including Picasso’s Guernica, inspired by the Spanish Civil War, which according to
Picasso’s wishes, was not allowed to enter Spain until democracy had been reestablished.
This event marked Spain’s entry into the modern sphere of art, after very little cultural
activity for so many years (Arango 1985, 211).
The Church was largely in support of the transition to democracy, as Juan Carlos
generally wanted the same things that the Church wanted. There was significantly less
tension between the church and the state at first because during the transition, both sides
supported a free Church in a free state, and the state was even willing to make
concessions to the Church. However, after the socialist government came to power in
1982, it was much more difficult for the Catholic Church to stay neutral as that’s when
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the issues of abortion, divorce, and the expansion of state education came into play. By
the 1980s a previous decline in religious vocations seemed to be evening out, and while
there was definitely a decline in religious identity in Spain, the general attitude was that
practicing Catholics in Spain were ‘fewer but better’. The general consensus of a few
surveys conducted before 1980, indicate that while 80% of people consider themselves to
be Catholic, less than 40% of people considered themselves to be regularly practicing
Catholics, while 82.8% believed in God (Payne 1984, 213-219). While the number of
practicing Catholics, was only a fraction of those who considered themselves to be
Catholic, a European Values System Study in 1981 found that there were actually more
people in Spain who believed in the existence of God, the devil, and Hell, than anywhere
else in Europe and they had more confidence in the Church compared to other
institutions. Additionally, the remnants of a Catholic culture were still very much present
in the local religious festivals practiced throughout the country (Payne 1984, 226-227).
Some of the issues that had plagued Spain for many years, like divorce, abortion
and the relationship between sexes, faced a lot of debate after the end of the Franco
regime. Another great issue was education reform, which heavily involved the Catholic
Church. On July 20, 1981 the divorce bill became law, after facing lots of backlash from
the Catholic Church. The law allowed divorce after two years of separation so long as
both parties consented. While it was expected that many people would immediately rush
to the courts to begin divorce procedures, only 28,000 couples had even started legal
action after the law had been in effect for a year. Most of those couples were middle aged
and middle class (Arango 1985, 212-214).
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While the number of immediate divorces was much lower than expected, there
was still a lot of pushback against abortion especially by the church, leaders of which
argued that it would corrupt Spanish morals. However, the socialist government argued
that passing a law allowing abortion for certain reasons, was not changing the morals of
Spaniards, but reflecting morals that had already changed. It was even estimated that
before 1983 there were 300,000 abortions each year taking place in Spain (Arango 1985,
212-214).
One of the largest issues that plagued the new Spanish government was education
reform. This reflected the historical dominance of Catholic education, and the remnants
of a Catholic culture. The state was attempting to secularize society as much as possible
and was attempting to bring about education reforms that would take the responsibility of
education away from the Church and its institutions and give that power to the state and
its institutions. This process had already been established in all Western democracies but
the Church had been almost exclusively responsible for education since the Golden Age
in the 16th century. The Ley Orgánica del Derecho a la Educación (LODE, Organic Law
on the Right to an Education) affected primary and secondary education and would have
a major effect on future generations. The constitution contradicted itself stating that
everyone had a right to a free and obligatory education but there was also a freedom of
instruction and parents had the right to give their children a religious education by
sending them to a Catholic School. Eventually the LODE was passed despite great
opposition from the Right. This meant that the Catholic Church would no longer have as
great of a control over the education of students (Arango 1984, 216-218).
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How Modern is Contemporary Spanish Society and Culture?
The World Values Survey provides a good insight into the modern cultural and
social values in Spain and how they have changed from 1981 until 2014. Some of the
clearest indicators of the cultural and social modernization in Spain will be based around
religion, as most of traditional Spanish culture revolved around the Catholic Church but
most modern societies are particularly secular. Spain seems to have grown increasingly
secular, with 63% of respondents identifying themselves as “a religious person” in the
survey from 1981 to 1984, and only 40% identifying as a religious person in the 20102014 survey. In the same survey, 30% identified as “not a religious person” in the 19811984 survey but 50% identifying as not religious in the 2010-2014 survey (see Table 5.2
for more detailed results). Similarly, between 1989 and 2014, the number of respondents
who said that religion was “very important” in their lives shrunk greatly while those who
found religion to be “not at all important” increased. In the survey from 1989-1993, more
people (23%) said that religion was very important than those who said it was not
important at all (20%) whereas in the 2010-2014 survey, more people (36%) said that
religion was not important at all, compared to only 11% who said it was very important
(see Table 5.3 for more detailed results).
While the number of those who identify themselves as religious, and identify
religion as being very important to them has decreased, the number of respondents who
said that they belonged to a religious denomination is still very high. Although it was a
whopping 91% in the 1981-1984 survey, and it decreased to 74% of respondents in the
2005-2009 survey, 74% is still a large portion of respondents identifying themselves as
belonging to a religious denomination (see Table 5.4).
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The World Values Survey also provides public opinion data on some of the most
disputed topics that were argued against by the church, and were particularly taboo
during Franco’s time like divorce, abortion, and homosexuality. In the survey from 19811984, 28% of respondents said that divorce was “never justifiable” whereas only 15%
said that it was “always justifiable”. As Spain moved further and further away from the
Franco regime, these numbers changed completely, with only 5% of respondents finding
divorce to be “never justifiable” compared to 36% who felt that it was “always
justifiable” in the 2010-2014 survey (see Table 5.5). The public opinion on the
justification of abortion shows similar results. In the 1981-1984 survey, 48% of people
found abortion to be “never justifiable” compared to 18% of people in the 2010-2014
survey. Likewise, only 4% of respondents found abortion to be “always justifiable” in the
1981-1984 survey compared to 16% in the 2010-2014 survey (see Table 5.6). Once
again, similar results can be found for the public opinion of Spaniards on homosexuality.
In the survey from 1981-1984, 54% of respondents felt that homosexuality was “never
justifiable” compared to only 8% in the 2010-2014 survey. Those who felt that
homosexuality was “always justifiable in the were 5% of respondents in the 1981-1984
survey compared to 32% of respondents in the 2010-2014 survey (see Table 5.7).
Another major cultural difference that can be seen through the World Values
Survey data is the change in the family structure. Between 1981 and 2014 the number of
children that respondents had decreased. Those who had only 1 child in the 1981-1984
survey represented 10% of respondents whereas those who had only 1 child in the 20102014 survey represented 17% of the population. Those who had 4 children decreased
from 11% of respondents in the 1981-1984 survey to only 4% in the 2010-2014 survey,
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and those who had 5 or more children went from 9% of those surveyed in the 1981-1984
survey to only 2% of those surveyed in the 2010-2014 survey. Additionally, the number
of respondents who did not have children at all increased from 32% in the 1981-1984
survey to 36% in the 2010-2014 survey (see Table 5.8). Another representation of the
changing family values in Spain can be seen in the changes in marital status. In the 19811984 survey 65% of respondents were married and only 1% were “living together as
married”. This is vastly different from the only 50% who were married in the 2010-2014
survey and the 9% who were “living together as married”. Additionally, those who were
divorced went from 0% of respondents in the 1981-1984 survey to 4% in the 2010-2014
survey, which is still relatively low (see Table 5.9).
Some other indications from the World Values Survey that indicate the changes in
social and cultural attitudes in Spain have to do with attitudes towards women. While
18% of respondents in the 1989-1993 survey said that “being a housewife is just as
fulfilling” only 12% agreed with that statement in the 2010-2014 survey (see Table 5.10).
Additionally, in the 2010-2014 survey, 66% of respondents agreed that a job is the best
way for a woman to be independent (see table 5.11). In the 1989-1993 survey, 13% of
respondents reported that they “agree strongly” that pre-school children suffer if they
have a working mother, compared to just 5% of respondents in the 2010-2014 survey (see
Table 5.12). The number of respondents who felt that men should have more right to a
job than women if jobs are scarce decreased from 30% who agreed in the 1989-1993
survey to 12% in the 2010-2014 survey (see Table 5.13).
Some final indications of cultural and social modernization are urbanization and
rise in level of education. World Values Survey data shows that even just since 1994
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those respondents whose highest level of education was vocational secondary school
increased from only 7% to 13% of respondents from the 1994-1998 survey to the 20102014 survey. Those who completed university-preparatory secondary school increased
from 9% in the 1994-1998 survey to 16% in the 2005-2009 survey but then decreased
down to only 7% of respondents in the 2010-2014 survey. And strangely those with a
University degree or higher went from 13% in the 1994-1998 survey to only 7% in the
2010-2014 survey. The data seems to suggest that there has been a rise in
technical/vocational training rather than higher university education in recent years. Still,
those who had not even completed an elementary education as their highest level of
education, decreased from 30% of respondents in the 1994-1998 survey to only 6% of
respondents in the 2010-2014 survey so there is still a visible increase in education
among Spaniards (see Table 5.14). Finally, a large percent of the population in Spain is
living in urban environments, which is a major indicator of modernization. According to
the World Values Survey, in the survey from 2010-2014, 50% of the population lived in
cities of 50,000 people or more, which by most standards would be considered urban.
This was a slight increase from the 48% that lived in cities with 50,000 people or more in
the 2005-2009 survey (see Table 5.15).
Compared to Italy, Spain’s social and cultural modernization looked a little
different over time. Regarding family structure, Italy saw a decrease and then an increase
of the percentage of respondents who had no children. Spain saw an increase then a
decrease in the percentage of those respondents who did not have children, and though
both remained between 30 and 40 percent of respondents, Spain began and ended with a
smaller percentage of those who had no children. Additionally, while the number of
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respondents in Italy who had only one child fluctuated up and down, those Spaniards who
had only one child consistently increased in percent between 1981 and 2009. They had a
significantly lower number of respondents with only one child in 1981 and had nearly
caught up with Italy by 2009. Additionally, both Spain and Italy saw a decrease in the
number of respondents who were married, but Spain saw a much steeper decline. Spain
also had a larger number of those who were living together as married, and those who
were divorced over time (see Table 5.16 and Graph 5.1) (World Values Survey).
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Spain and Italy also both saw a number of changes in social opinions over the
years. Italy initially had a much higher percent of respondents who found abortion to be
“always justifiable” that decreased from 11% in the 1981-1984 survey to 4% in the 20052009 survey, while those in Spain who found abortion to be “always justifiable” rose
from 4% to 13% during that same time. Likewise, those who found abortion to be “never
justifiable” in Italy actually increased over time from 32% in the 1981-1984 survey to
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41% in the 2005-2009 survey, while those who found abortion to be “never justifiable” in
Spain decreased from 48% to 22%. Additionally, those who felt that divorce was “always
justifiable” decreased over time from 32% to 8% in Italy but increased over time from
15% to 26% in Spain. Those who found that divorce was “never justifiable” fluctuated
greatly in Italy but decreased from 28% to 8% in Spain between 1981 and 2009. Finally,
those who found religion to be important stayed between 33 and 34% in Italy, while
decreasing from 23% in the 1989-1993 survey to 15% in the 2005-2009 survey in Spain
(See table 5.17 and Table 5.2) (World Values Survey).
Graph 5.2
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Conclusion
Overall Spain scored a 3.517 out of 6 for social/cultural modernization. This
places it third out of the six countries it was compared with, as can be seen in Graph 5.3.
This places Spain very much on par with other “modern” countries. Those who scored
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higher were Sweden and Germany, and those who scored lower were Japan, the United
States, and Italy (see table 5.18 for detailed numbers).
Spanish cultural and societal norms have clearly undergone a major process of
modernization. Many opinions that would have been taboo during the Franco regime
have become the norm. Family structure has become less traditional, with more families
having fewer children and more people living together outside of marriage. The country
has also urbanized with at least half of the population living in an urban environment.
Basic education has increased, and women have more rights in laws supported by public
opinion. And the nation has definitely become more secular.
Graph 5.3
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CHAPTER 6: POLITICAL MODERNIZATION

Spain saw some political change during the end of the Franco Regime as Franco
began to loosen his control on the country, due to outside pressures. However, the most
significant political change in the late twentieth century in Spain was the rapid transition
to democracy after Franco’s death. This transition was essential in Spain’s modernization
process as it helped to bring Spain fully into the modern sphere.

Politics of the Early Franco Regime
In the beginning of the dictatorship, Franco was truly a Fascist dictator. After
triumphing in the Civil War, Franco essentially continued to rule all of Spain; in the
same way he had ruled the Nationalist zone during the war. Franco ruled in a top
down manner and gave a good deal of power to the Falange. Franco ruled in an
authoritarian, and traditionalist manner and his regime tended to support large
landowners and financiers, while banning the trade unions of industrial workers,
essentially giving favor to those who supported the 1936 revolt. There was a heavy
military presence and citizens lacked a right of association and expression during
the beginning of the dictatorship. As the dictatorship continued, Franco did attempt
to give his dictatorship the appearance of democracy, at least to the outside world,
but things remained mostly the same. Throughout the entire beginning of the
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dictatorship Franco ruled with inspiration from the past glory of the golden age of
Spain (Ross 2000, 95-99).

Political Change at the End of the Franco Regime
Trends like tourism, emigration, and the depopulation of the countryside in the
1960s led to a growing political opposition for the regime. The Interior Minister, General
Alonso Vega kept this opposition in check as his conservative policies made him
regarded as a compliment to the economic liberalization. However, the growing
discontent sowed the seeds for future protests. The 1966 Press Act (later known as the
Fraga Act for one of its biggest supporters) changed the regime’s control over the media
by abolishing the “prior censorship” idea where editors had to get material approved
before they published it, under the Fraga Act they were able to judge for themselves.
They still faced punishments if they judged incorrectly, creating a sort of self-censorship,
but it was relaxed enough that some mildly critical journals began to appear, but criticism
was still limited to economics (Ross 2000, 112-113). At first there was a major increase
in press publications, in fact there were 129 new publications, however there were many
restrictive measures put into place within a few months of the law being passed (Tusell
2011, 214).
In 1967 some basic laws showed the changing political relaxation, offering a
degree of religious freedom. For the first time since 1939 people were allowed to practice
faiths other than Catholicism publicly thanks to the “Organic Law of the State”. This
same law also allowed parliamentary elections. These elections were still something of a
sham, being subject to strict control by authorities who ensured that only approved
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candidates were successful, and they were restricted to the male heads of households.
Once again this proved that political change was lagging behind economic change. The
1960s also saw a growth in opposition from regionalist as well as the church (Ross 2000,
113).
As Spain entered into the new decade of the 1970’s Franco was 78 and in his old
age was beginning to prepare for his imminent death. While he prepared for his death, his
opponents prepared for a potential confrontation. Although he still had the ultimate
authority, in the 1960s, Franco didn’t determine the day-to-day operations of his regime.
He was very careful when choosing his successor. The Organic Law of 1967 established
that there would be a new king who would serve as a figurehead without any real power.
Prince Juan Carlos had been preparing to be the future king most of his life and seemed
to know what was expected of him. In 1969 Franco appointed his trusted servant Admiral
Luis Carrero deputy Prime Minister, with the intention that he would succeed him as the
head of the Government whenever he passed. In this situation, Juan Carlos would have
some power but his power was easily controlled by the other bodies still in existence with
supporters who Franco himself had appointed (Ross 2000, 117-120).

The Transition to Democracy
The transition technically began after Franco’s death in 1975. However, the
undercurrents of the transition began a few years before. Franco’s ‘liberalization’
program did not halt the growing opposition to the regime. In fact, as the regime began to
loosen its grip, the dissenters called for more freedoms. Franco’s appointment of the
authoritarian Carrero Blanco as prime minister in 1973 was seen as a regression. Basque
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terrorists assassinated Carrero less than 6 months after he was appointed. Franco replaced
him with Carlos Arias Navarro who gave hope that the right to form political associations
might be on the horizon as well as a slight liberalization. However, while Franco was still
alive he offered mostly cosmetic proposals (Arango 1985, 93-94; Ross 117-120).
As Franco became sicker Juan Carlos became the acting head of state for a brief
period before Franco resumed his office. Franco passed a bill allowing for political
associations but once again it was mostly superficial as political associations had to be
judged by the National Movement and alternative political opinions were not allowed.
This however created even more opposition to the regime even before the bill became
law. In fact, in 1974 a Democratic Junta was created in Pairs, which was made up of
Communists, a branch of the Socialist party, Carlists, and representatives of Workers
Commissions (which were not allowed). Their platform called for a total break with a
dismantling of the National Movement, and the legalization of all political parties and
trade unions. To add to the chaos, in 1975, Spain saw a major increase in terrorist activity
(Arango 1985, 94-95).
By the mid-1975 political opposition groups were growing bolder and beginning
to organize in Spain. One group was the Democratic Convergence, which linked the
Socialist party (PSOE), the Social Democrats of Dionisio Ridruejo, the Carlists after they
left the Democratic Junta, the moderate Basque nationalist party (the PNV) and some
other small regionalist parties. Even some of the political elite, such as cabinet ministers
who wrote a column supporting reform (Arango 1985, 95-96).
On November 20, 1975, in this state, with growing political opposition and unrest,
Juan Carlos became the king of Spain, and the transition to democracy officially began.
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Juan Carlos kept Arias as prime minister, who made promises that seemed empty, and
while he offered the legalization of political parties, he made a point that Communist and
Separatists parties would not be tolerated (Arango 1985, 96-97; Palomares 2004, 151).
Arias’ reforms did not include the possibility of elections and proved to be disappointing
to almost anyone who desired reform in Spain (Palomares 2004, 151). As Palomares put
it, “Carlos Arias proved incapable of confronting either the growing pressure of the
democratic opposition and the regime’s moderates or the pressure coming from the
regime hardliners” (Palomares 2004, 161). In this light, after a failed attempt at a new
successful Law of Political Associations, Arias resigned on July 1, 1976, and Juan Carlos
appointed Adolfo Suárez as his successor (Arango 1985, 96-97).
Spain was in desperate need of leadership that could peacefully transition the
country to democracy, navigating both the former supporters of Franco and the
opposition without alienating either side (Palomares 2004, 161). At the time of Franco’s
death, very little was known about Juan Carlos’ political beliefs. He was trained by
Franco and had not shown any democratic tendencies. Likewise, not much was known
about Suárez’s democratic ideals. But “together they embraced democracy” and began
creating reforms that came from the Fundamental Laws of the Franco regime, so as to not
try to make any drastic changes too quick (Arango 1985, 98). Eventually they were able
to legally remove the laws of the Franco regime in order to create a democratic,
constitutional monarchy. Juan Carlos and Suárez had to tread carefully in order to
maintain peace in this tricky time, but they were lucky to have the armed forces on their
side (Arango 1985, 88-89). During Franco’s time the Army reported to Franco as their
supreme leader, thus when Franco appointed Juan Carlos as his successor, he gained all
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the control that Franco once held over the Army including their support (Tusell 2011,
307). Continuing to fight for balance among the many political spheres, Juan Carlos
replaced military leaders who were unsympathetic to liberalization and issued many
amnesty decrees for political prisoners (Arango 1985, 98-99).
On November 16, 1976 the Cortes passed the Law of Political Reform, which
ended the dictatorship, called for the creation of a new bicameral legislature, and allowed
for universal suffrage. This law went to referendum December 16, 1976 and passed with
94.2 percent approval of the 78 percent of the electorate who voted. Suárez worked hard
to meet with the opposition, creating an atmosphere of trust, and try to compromise
where he could. In 1977, as they prepared for the upcoming elections, Suárez and Juan
Carlos removed many of the leftover restraints of the Franco regime. Political parties,
including the Socialist party were legalized, the right to strike was established, the
organization of free trade unions was permitted, the National Movement was abolished,
and eventually the Communist party was even legalized (Arango 1985, 99-101).
Finally, on June 15, 1977, the Spaniards had their first free elections since 1939.
Over 79 percent of the electorate showed up with 18,447,714 voters. No party won the
absolute majority of votes or seats in the 350-seat lower house the Congress. The upper
house was the Senate, and together they were the Cortes. There was a voting system of
proportional representation and the election results can be seen in Table 6.1 (Arango
1985, 101-102). This election marked the beginning of a new era in Spanish politics as
for the first time such a wide variety of political parties sat side by side in the Cortes. Not
only were the political parties varied, but also the Cortes now housed members from a
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variety of professions and classes rather than just the “Francoist Elite” (Palomares 2004,
186).
Leading up to the elections there were countless political parties, so many that it
was impossible to keep track of them all now that they were legal. However, most
Spaniards it seemed were uninterested in politics. In fact, 70% of Spaniards claimed to be
hardly or not at all concerned with politics while only 4% claimed to be very interested in
politics, so the moderate results of the elections should have come as no surprise (Tusell
2011, 289). The results of the election fared on the moderate side, which should have
been expected given poll results that were published frequently just before Franco’s
death. The Spanish people were asked questions about their politics, religion, jobs,
income, and political philosophy among other things. These surveys showed a people that
were interested in reform but not desperate or radical. The election showed a left-right
split, both sides erring towards the center (Arango 1985, 103). Finally, Spain had
transitioned into a democratic government, but the ‘Transition’ was far from over
(Palomares 2004, 186-187).
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Table 6.1 (Arango 1985, 101-102)
Party
Type of Party
Percent
of the
Votes
Unión del Centro Democrático (UCD,
Centrist
34.8%
Democratic Center Union)
Coalition
Partido Socialista Obrero Español
Socialist party
29.4%
(PSOE, Spanish Socialist Worker’s
Party)
Partido Comunista Español (PCE,
Communist
9.3%
Spanish Communist Party)
party
Alianza Popular (AP, Popular Alliance)
Conservative
8.4%
Coalition
Convergencia i Unio (CiU, Convergence Catalan party
3.7%
and Union)
Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV,
Basque
1.7%
Basque Nationalist Party)
regionalist party

Number
of Seats
165
118

20
16
11
8

Shortly after the election there was a congressional committee set up to draft the
constitution. The benefit of the wide variety of political parties was that there was no one
party that was strong enough to have total control over the creation of the constitution
and alienate any large minority (like what happened leading up to the Civil War). The
government had to continue working under certain Francoist regulations until the new
order was officially put into place so many solutions to issues such as socioeconomic
difficulties were short term (Arango 1985, 104-105). During this time there were also a
series of civil disturbances namely by ETA the Basque terrorist group, that caused extra
tension in this new period (Tusell 2011, 295). However, 1977 was a year of great
progress. Essential economic reform began to take shape, with a ceiling on wage
increases, a restructuring of public expenditures like social security, tax reform, price
controls on essential commodities, unemployment insurance, and fiscal and financial
reform. Many sociopolitical reforms were put into place as well, for example, the
decriminalization of adultery, the legalization of contraceptives, the modification of rape
82

statutes—benefiting women, as well as the reorganization of the police, the military Civil
Guard, and the Armed Police. Throughout 1977 many regions began to receive ‘preautonomy decrees’ allowing for regional legislature (Arango 1985, 104-106).
The Committee on Constitutional Affairs and a subcommittee drafted the
Constitution and it was presented to the floors of Congress and the Senate for debate in
July of 1978. Some of the main issues that were debated over were the place of the
Catholic Church in this new system, what state aid would look like to private (mostly
Catholic) schools, and the issues of abortion and divorce. After passing in congress, it
was sent to a Spanish referendum and passed on December 6, 1978. There were a smaller
number of voters for the referendum for the constitution than the previous referendum in
1976 which approved the Law for Political Change, but out of 17,873,301 voters,
15,706,078 voted “yes” which was 87.87 percent of those who voted (Arango, 1985, 106108).

The Current Political System
Spain is currently a constitutional monarchy with parliamentary government.
While the state is “unitary and indivisible” it recognizes autonomous regions within the
nation as a whole (Arango 1985, 125). The power and authority of each autonomous
region comes from the constitution and each region is still subject to the constitution. The
constitution of 1978 created all the political rights of Spain today so by the constitution,
no autonomous community may claim that their right to autonomy predates the
constitution (Arango 1985. 125).
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Juan Carlos I was the first monarch of Spain after the Franco regime, and his
status as king, comes from the constitution but he is also a direct descendent of the
Bourbon house that sat on the throne before the Second Republic. After Franco’s death,
Juan Carlos had the difficult job of changing Spain politically while not polarizing the
different sides of the political spectrum. Luckily for him, he did have an advantage of
widespread support. On one hand, he was Franco’s successor, and he was a Bourbon. So
those who were loyal to Franco, or the Bourbon dynasty, like the extreme right and the
military, wanted to support Juan Carlos, even though he was creating a new democratic
regime. As Arango put it, this situation “contributed mightily to the stability of the
fledging political system” (Arango 1985, 126). With the exception of a military coup on
February 23, 1981, when a group of military civil guards hijacked the Cortes, Spain has
managed to maintain its democratic status since the transition (Palomares 2004, 192).

How Modern is the Spanish Political System Today?
The above data gives an idea of the political changes that Spain underwent from
the time of Franco’s dictatorship to transform into the Constitutional Monarchy that it is
today. It would be difficult to argue that Spain has not transformed into a modern
political state, but to illustrate even further the current state of democracy, we will look at
data from the World Values Survey collected for Spain between 1990 and 2014.
One of the most obvious questions that could be used to indicate democracy in
Spain today that was asked was, “And how democratically is this country being governed
today?” (World Values Survey). Respondents were asked to rank Spain on a scale of 110, 1 being “not at all democratic” and 10 being “completely democratic”. This question
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was asked in the 2005-2009 survey and the 2010-2014 survey, and the results can be seen
in Table 6.2. The opinion of the ‘democratic-ness’ of the country actually fell. Those
saying that it was completely democratic (10) went from 18% in the first survey to only
11% in the second survey. Those who responded with a 9 stayed the same with 10% of
responders. Those who put Spain as an 8 on the democratic scale went from 20% in the
first survey to 16% in the second survey. Likewise, in the first survey 22% of respondents
said that Spain was about a 7 out of 10 on the democratic scale while in the second
survey only 16% of respondents had that same answer. Those who said that Spain was a
6 on the democratic scale went from 14% of respondents in the first survey to 13% in the
second survey.
Potentially the most concerning for the opinion of the democratic system in Spain
would be that those who considered Spain to be only a 5 out of 10 on the democratic
scale went from 10% of the respondents in the first survey to a whopping 17% in the
second survey (the highest percent in the second survey). Fitting with that trend, those
who responded that Spain was a 4 on the democracy scale went from 3% to 8%, and
those who responded that Spain was a 3 on the democracy scale went from 1% to 4%
from the first to the second survey. Finally, those who said that Spain was a 2 on the
democratic scale, or said that Spain was not democratic at all, both went from 0% of
respondents to 1% of respondents (World Values Survey).
Another relevant question, that must be considered when interpreting the result of
the respondents saying that Spain is less democratic, is “How important is it for you to
live in a country that is governed democratically?” Spaniards were asked this question in
the final two surveys (2005-2009 and 2010-2014) and were asked to respond on a scale
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of 1 to 10, with 1 being “not at all important” and 10 being “absolutely important”. See
Table 6.3 for the full results, but those who said ranked the importance of democracy
being “absolutely important” (10) actually went from 50% of respondents to 45% of
respondents from the first to the second survey. While those who ranked the importance
of democracy as 9 on a scale of 10, went up from 10% to 14% and those who ranked the
importance of democracy as an 8 out of 10 went up from 15% to 16% from the first
survey to the second survey (World Values Survey). The majority still ranked living in a
country with democracy as being “absolutely important” however the results indicate a
trend that democracy could be coming just slightly less important for Spaniards as the
dictatorship moves further and further into the past.
In four surveys between 1994 and 2014, The World Values Survey asked the
Spanish people whether a democratic political system was a “very good”, “fairly good”,
“fairly bad”, or “very bad” way of governing a country. See Table 6.3 for detailed results
but in each survey the clear majority (over 80%) of respondents said that democracy was
a “very good” or “fairly good” way of governing. In fact, the majority in each of the four
surveys (except for the very first survey from 1994-1998 where 47% of respondents said
that democracy was “fairly good” while only 42% said that democracy was “very good”)
said that a democratic system was “very good” (World Values Survey). The results seem
to indicate that democracy has been thought of as a great way to govern and has only
become more valued for Spaniards, as time has gone by. This just slightly contrasts with
the previous question, where Spaniards seemed to place slightly less importance on living
in a country with democracy in recent years, but even with the slightly downward trend,
most Spaniards ranked living in a country with democracy as being pretty important (7
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out of 10 on an importance scale or higher) and that does not necessarily affect their
perception on a democracy as a “very good” form of a political system.
The World Values Survey did not have as much data for Italy over time, but there
is some time-series data that shows the percentage of respondents that felt that having a
democratic political system was “very good” or fairly good”. While Italy began with a
higher percentage of respondents in favor of democracy, they saw a small decrease over
time, while Spain saw a much larger increase in those in favor of democracy, to actually
surpass Italy (see table 6.4). This gives the appearance of Spain, catching up to Italy
(World Values Survey).

Conclusion
Overall, Spain scored a 3 out of 6 for political modernity. It was once again
ranked third out of the six countries that were being compared, as can be seen in Graph
6.1. The countries that scored above it included Sweden and Germany, while those that
scored below it included Italy, Japan, and the United States (see Table 6.5 for their full
numerical scores).
While the response of the first question presented from the World Values Series
Data seems to indicate that country had begun to be regarded as slightly less democratic
by the time of the second wave of questioning (2010-2014), it is important to look at the
bigger picture and notice that 83% of respondents still ranked Spain as a five or higher on
the democratic scale which is all on the upper half of the scale, indicating that citizens
regard it as still mostly democratic. Additionally, given the results of the second two
questions from the World Values Survey presented above, it is clear that Democracy is

87

still very important to Spaniards. When you look at the results of these surveys and take
into consideration the major political changes that Spain underwent in the second half of
the twentieth century and especially since 1975, Spain has made considerable progress
and can unquestionably be considered democratic today. Spain clearly is operating with a
modern political system.
Graph 6.1

Political Modernity Average Score
6

Modernity Score

5
4

Germany
Italy

3

Japan
2

Spain
Sweden

1

United States
0
Germany

Italy

Japan

Spain

Country

88

Sweden

United
States

CONCLUSION

After looking at Spanish history beginning with the Second Republic until after
the transition to democracy, and examining the various indicators of modernization, it is
made clear that Spain is undeniably a modern nation. The Los Angeles Times observed
as far back as March 20, 1983:
“Today Spain has dramatically changed. It has become a land of relentless modernization as well
as capitalism, a conspiracy of modernism, enlightenment and moderation incorporating king and
leaders of every party, all of them scrupulously democratic in everything they say, polite in their
criticisms of others, invariably positive and constructive. It is the last thing a veteran of the Civil
War might expect to find” (Arango 1985, 220).

Of course, there are certain areas where Spain lacks or lags behind a bit, but Spain’s rapid
modernization process was a good example of complete modernization. The case of
Spain seems to support theorists like Lipset, Rostow, and Dahl who argued that economic
development leads to democracy (Spain’s modern form of government). The economic
modernization process, beginning under Franco when he opened up the economy, paved
way for the social and political modernization that followed. As the economy opened up
and industrialized, foreign investment, and tourism brought new cultural ideals and
values. These little cultural influences were unable to be completely censored by the
regime and were thus out of the control of the regime. With new social and cultural
values, new political ideas began to circulate. As Franco got older and slowly began to
lose a bit of control, there was an increasing amount of space for these new political
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ideals to gain traction (though never officially, until after Franco’s death). These things
set the stage for the rapid transition to democracy after Franco’s death, the last piece that
had to be set into motion for the modernization of Spain to be complete. Throughout the
transition to democracy, cultural values continued to change and the economy went
through changes, but it seemed that democracy was the last missing piece needed to
complete the modernization process.
Overall, taking into account the scores of all three of factors of modernization,
Spain scored an average of 3.306 out of 6 on the modernity scale, placing it third once
again out of the six countries it was compared with. This can be illustrated in Graph 7.1.
Sweden and Germany had average scores of 1.697 and 3.169 respectively, placing them
ahead of Spain, and Italy scored 4.063, Japan scored 4.238 and the United States scored
4.279 placing them behind Spain. Of course, each of most of these countries were chosen
because they were known for being modern, and Italy was chosen because of its’
proximity to Spain, historically and geographically, but they illustrate that after a difficult
transition, Spain fits right in, with the modern world.
Additionally, when comparing Spain with Italy, a similar country, over time,
Spain often seemed to be lagging behind Italy in the years immediately following the
transition to democracy. However, when looking at data from more recent years, as well
as the modernity scores used in this thesis, it is clear that Spain has caught up with or
surpassed Italy in terms of many modern indicators. This suggests that although Spain
began its process of modernization after many of the other countries in Europe, it
modernized at a rapid rate and was easily able to catch up.
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Graph 7.1
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If we revisit our indicators from the Modernization section, we can analyze the
modernization of Spain more clearly. Economically Spain industrialized and transitioned
from a rural agrarian society to an urban industrial society. The economy was opened up
and throughout the modernization process there was a steady increase in wealth. There
was also a large increase in technology per capita beginning in the end of the Franco
period.
Just to illustrate that Spain is on par with the rest of Europe’s modern economy,
we can examine some World Bank data. The indicator for the service economy shows
that in 2016, the service sector represented 73.761% of the Spanish GDP, compared to
73.913% of the GDP of the European Union. Spain’s 2016 agricultural production was
still higher than that of the European Union, but it was relatively low at 2.768% of the
Spanish GDP compared to 1.556% of the GDP of the European Union (World Bank).
The urbanization that Spain saw is also an indicator of social modernization, as
Spain moved from a more rural society to a more urban one. Spain did see education
improvements though more recently the number of people who have earned a university
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degree seems to be lacking. Opportunities for women were increased over time and
public opinion data now shows that Women and Men are generally viewed as being fairly
equal. Family units changed, as birth rates and marriages both declined, and living
together outside of marriage increased. And Spain became undoubtedly more secular.
Public data also showed much more liberal viewpoints on issues that are not supported by
the Catholic Church, such as abortion, divorce, and homosexuality.
Today, Spain fits right in with the European Union. World Bank data shows that
the 2015 birth rate in the European Union was 9.985 births per 1,000 people, whereas the
2015 birth rate in Spain was 9 per 1,000 people. The 2015 urban percent of the total
population in the European Union was 75.026%, whereas in Spain it was 79.802%. This
is a major change from the 56.567% of the Spanish population in 1960 and the 61.213%
of the population of the European Union (World Bank).
While democracy itself is not the only form of a modern political state, it is one
good example. Spain underwent a transition to democracy that has lasted to this day.
Public opinion data shows that Spaniards are attuned to democratization and feel that it is
a good thing and place a high importance on democracy in their country. Public opinion
data also shows that Spaniards do feel that Spain is democratic today in practice not just
in name.
Given all of these factors, Spain seems to be a good clear example of rapid
modernization, specifically modernization beginning with the economic sector. While of
course, all of the factors had to align perfectly for Spain to transition in the way that it
did, Spain can provide insight into what the modernization might look like for another
traditional country that finds itself finally free of a lasting dictatorship. Because Spain
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modernized later than much of the rest of Europe, it had more modern influence and
technology to help speed up the transition. Over the course of the last thirty or so years
technology has made major strides and it seems likely that if the economic, social, and
political climate is right, with the help of technology other countries might even be able
to see a more rapid transition to democracy.
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APPENDIX
Chapter 4 Tables
Table 4.1 World Values Survey Subjective Social Class
Social Class
(Subjective)
Upper class
Upper middle class
Lower middle class
Working class
Lower class
Not asked in
survey
Don´t know

1994-1998
Survey (% of
respondents)
0%
13%
25%
50%
8%

1999-2004
Survey (% of
respondents)
0%
9%
17%
22%
2%

2005-2009
Survey (% of
respondents)
1%
3%
64%
26%
4%

2010-2014
Survey (% of
respondents)
0%
4%
68%
24%
4%

0%
4%

50%
1%

0%
2%

0%
1%

Table 4.2 World Values Survey Income Scales
Scale of
Incomes
Lower step
Second step
Third step
Fourth step
Fifth step
Sixth step
Seventh
step
Eighth step
Ninth step
Tenth step
Missing;
Unknown
No answer
Don´t know

1981-1984
Survey (% of

1989-1993
Survey (% of

1994-1998
Survey (% of

1999-2004
Survey (% of

2005-2009
Survey (% of

2010-2014
Survey (% of

respondents)

respondents)

respondents)

respondents)

respondents)

respondents)

4%
6%
10%
15%
17%
12%

7%
8%
13%
16%
15%
10%

3%
15%
15%
18%
8%
6%

5%
8%
12%
15%
12%
9%

4%
8%
13%
18%
26%
12%

4%
6%
14%
16%
28%
12%

9%
7%
3%
7%

7%
4%
2%
2%

3%
2%
1%
1%

4%
3%
1%
1%

9%
3%
0%
0%

7%
2%
0%
0%

11%
0%
0%

0%
9%
9%

0%
0%
27%

0%
11%
20%

1%
6%
0%

0%
6%
4%
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Table 4.3 World Values Series Wealth Accumulation
Wealth
Accumulation

1989-1993
Survey (% of
respondents)

1994-1998
Survey (% of
respondents)

2005-2009
Survey (% of
respondents)

2010-2014
Survey (% of
respondents)

8%
7%
8%
8%
16%
8%
9%
11%
7%

10%
4%
5%
6%
12%
8%
8%
18%
12%

6%
8%
11%
11%%
23%
10%
13%
10%
2%

6%
5%
8%
8%
19%
13%
15%
13%
5%

10%
0%
9%

9%
0%
7%

2%
0%
4%

4%
1%
3%

People can only
get rich at the
expense of others
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Wealth can grow
so there´s enough
for everyone
No answer
Don´t know

Table 4.4 World Values Survey Satisfaction with Financial Situation of Household
Satisfaction with
financial
situation of
household
Dissatisfied

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Satisfied
Don´t know

1981-1984
Survey (% of
respondents)

1989-1993
Survey (% of
respondents)

1994-1998
Survey (% of
respondents)

1999-2004
Survey (% of
respondents)

2005-2009
Survey (% of
respondents)

2010-2014
Survey (% of
respondents)

4%
3%
8%
9%
16%
16%
19%
13%
5%
6%
1%

3%
2%
4%
7%
18%
17%
22%
15%
6%
4%
2%

4%
3%
7%
9%
24%
18%
23%
1%
5%
5%
1%

3%
1%
4%
5%
21%
18%
22%
14%
4%
7%
1%

2%
3%
4%
11%
19%
20%
23%
12%
3%
2%
0%

4%
3%
9%
12%
22%
15%
15%
14%
3%
2%
0%
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Table 4.5 World Values Survey Employment Status in Spain
Employment
Status

Full time
Part time
Self
employed
Retired
Housewife
Students
Unemployed
Other

1981-1984
Survey
(% of
respondents)
28%
3%

1989-1993
Survey
(% of
respondents)
34%
4%

14%
9%
33%
7%
5%
0%

1994-1998
Survey
(% of
respondents)
26%
6%

8%
16%
25%
7%
6%
0%

1999-2004
Survey
(% of
respondents)
33%
6%

3%
21%
23%
8%
13%
0%

2005-2009
Survey
(% of
respondents)
41%
4%

6%
16%
22%
6%
8%
2%

7%
18%
16%
6%
7%
0%

2010-2014
Survey
(% of
respondents)
32%
4%
6%
19%
13%
7%
19%
1%

Table 4.6 World Values Survey Italy and Spain Comparison Over Time

Unemployed
Housewife
Satisfied with
Household
Income
Lower-Third
Income Step
FourthSeventh
Income Step
Eighth-Tenth
Income Step
Upper or
Lower Middle
Class

Italy
19811984
3%
22%

Spain
19811984
5%
33%

Italy
19891993
4%
18%

Spain
19891993
6%
25%

Italy
19992004
4%
14%

Spain
19992004
8%
22%

Italy
20052009
6%
9%

Spain
20052009
7%
16%

10%

6%

13%

4%

-

7%

6%

2%

12%

19%

41%

28%

27%

25%

32%

25%

37%

53%

29%

48%

31%

40%

23%

65%

32%

17%

0%

8%

18%

5%

11%

3%

-

-

-

-

-

-

53%

67%

Table 4.7: Economic Modernity Average Score
Average
Score

Germany

Italy

Japan

Spain

Sweden

United
States

3.6

4.2

4

3.4

2

3.8
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Chapter 5 Tables
Table 5.2: World Values Survey Religious Person
Religious
Person

1981-1984
Survey

1989-1993
Survey (% of

1994-1998
Survey (% of

1999-2004
Survey (% of

2005-2009
Survey (% of

2010-2014
Survey (% of

respondents)

respondents)

respondents)

respondents)

respondents)

63

64

67

59

49

40

30

27

27

31

39

50

4

4

3

6

9

8

4
0

5
0

2
0

3
1

2
1

1
1

(% of
respondents)

A religious
person
Not a
religious
person
A
convinced
atheist
Don´t
know
No answer

Table 5.3: World Values Survey Important in Life: Religion
Important in
life: Religion
Very
important
Rather
important
Not very
important
Not at all
important
Don´t know
No answer

1989-1993
Survey (% of
respondents)

1994-1998
Survey (% of
respondents)

1999-2004
Survey (% of
respondents)

2005-2009
Survey (% of
respondents)

2010-2014
Survey (% of
respondents)

23

25

18

15

11

30

32

27

23

21

26

28

31

31

31

20

14

23

31

36

1
0

1
0

1
0

0
0

0
1

Table 5.4: World Values Survey Belong to Religious Denomination
Belong to
religious
denomination
No
Yes

1981-1984
Survey (% of
respondents)
9
91

1989-1993
Survey (% of
respondents)
14
86

97

1994-1998
Survey (% of
respondents)
18
82

1999-2004
Survey (% of
respondents)
25
74

Table 5.5: World Values Survey Justifiable: Divorce
Justifiable:
Divorce
Never
justifiable
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Always
justifiable
Don´t know

1981-1984
Survey (%

1989-1993
Survey (%

1994-1998
Survey (%

1999-2004
Survey (%

2005-2009
Survey (%

2010-2014
Survey (%

of respondents)

of respondents)

of respondents)

of respondents)

of respondents)

of respondents)

28
7
7
5
15
6
6
7
2

19
4
5
5
18
7
6
8
6

15
2
3
4
21
7
6
7
7

11
3
4
6
18
8
10
9
7

8
2
2
3
16
6
10
14
10

5
1
1
3
13
8
13
11
7

15

18

23

21

26

36

4

3

4

2

2

2

0

0

0

1

0

1

No answer

Table 5.6: World Values Survey Justifiable: Abortion
Justifiable:
Abortion
Never
justifiable
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Always
justifiable
Don´t know

1981-1984
Survey (%

1989-1993
Survey (%

1994-1998
Survey (%

1999-2004
Survey (%

2005-2009
Survey (%

2010-2014
Survey (%

of respondents)

of respondents)

of respondents)

of respondents)

of respondents)

of respondents)

48
10
8
5
12
3
3
2
1

29
6
8
6
18
6
5
5
3

32
5
3
6
19
6
5
4
3

27
7
5
5
19
7
6
7
4

22
5
5
4
18
7
8
9
5

18
3
6
4
20
7
10
9
3

4

10

11

10

13

16

5

4

5

3

3

3

0

0

0

1

1

1

No answer
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Table 5.7: World Values Survey Justifiable: Homosexuality
Justifiable:
Homosexuality

1981-1984
Survey

1989-1993
Survey (%

1994-1998
Survey (%

1999-2004
Survey (%

2005-2009
Survey (%

2010-2014
Survey (%

(% of
respondents)

of
respondents)

of
respondents)

of
respondents)

of
respondents)

of
respondents)

54
6
6
4
10
3
3
3
1

41
6
5
4
14
5
4
4
3

22
3
3
4
19
5
6
7
5

16
4
5
6
17
7
6
7
5

14
3
4
3
16
7
9
10
7

8
2
2
3
14
8
10
10
5

5

10

19

22

23

32

6

5

6

4

4

4

0

0

0

1

2

1

Never
justifiable
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Always
justifiable
Don´t know
No answer

Table 5.8 World Values Survey How Many Children do you have?
How many
Children do
you have
No child
1 child
2 children
3 children
4 children
5 children
6 children
7 children
8 or more
children

1981-1984
Survey (%

1989-1993
Survey (%

1994-1998
Survey (%

1999-2004
Survey (%

2005-2009
Survey (%

2010-2014
Survey (%

of respondents)

of respondents)

of respondents)

of respondents)

of respondents)

of respondents)

32
10
21
16
11
4
3
1

32
13
25
16
7
3
3
0

32
14
25
14
7
3
1
1

36
13
25
15
6
3
1
1

34
16
30
12
3
2
1
0

36
17
28
13
4
2
0
0

1

0

1

1

0

0

Table 5.9: World Values Series Marital Status
Marital
Status

Married
Living
together as
married
Divorced
Separated
Widowed
Single/Never
married

1981-1984
Survey (% of
respondents)
65

1989-1993
Survey (% of
respondents)
62

1994-1998
Survey (% of
respondents)
62

1999-2004
Survey (% of
respondents)
57

2005-2009
Survey (% of
respondents)
50

2010-2014
Survey (%
of
respondents)
50

1
0
1
9

1
1
1
9

3
1
2
7

2
1
2
8

5
4
3
8

9
4
3
7

25

25

26

29

29

27
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Table 5.10 World Values Survey Being a Housewife is just as Fulfilling
Being a
Housewife is
just as
Fulfilling
Agree
strongly
Agree
Disagree
Strongly
disagree
Don’t know
No Answer

1989-1993
Survey (%
of
respondents)

1994-1998
Survey (%
of
respondents)

1999-2004
Survey (%
of
respondents)

2005-2009
Survey (%
of
respondents)

2010-2014
Survey (%
of
respondents)

18
34
28

14
42
31

18
37
27

13
33
24

12
32
35

7
12
0

6
6
0

10
8
0

21
8
0

10
8
3

Table 5.11: World Values Survey Job is the best way for Women to be Independent
Job is the best way for
women to be independent
Agree
Neither
Disagree
Don’t know
No answer

2010-2014 Survey (% of
respondents)
66
14
17
2
1

Table 5.12: World Values Survey Pre-School Child Suffers with Working Mother
Pre-school
Child Suffers
with Working
Mother
Agree strongly
Agree
Disagree
Strongly
disagree
Don’t know
No Answer

1989-1993
Survey (% of
respondents)
13
38
34

1999-2004
Survey (% of
respondents)
7
35
42

2005-2009
Survey (% of
respondents)
10
35
31

2010-2014
Survey (% of
respondents)
5
22
54

6
8
0

9
7
0

19
5
0

14
3
1

Table 5.13: World Values Survey Jobs Scarce: Men should have more Right to a
Job than Women
Jobs Scarce:
Men should
have more
right to a job
than women
Agree
Disagree
Neither
Don’t know
No Answer

1989-1993
Survey (%
of
respondents)
30
60
8
2
0

1994-1998
Survey (%
of
respondents)
27
57
15
1
0

1999-2004
Survey (%
of
respondents)
19
64
15
2
1

100

2005-2009
Survey (%
of
respondents)
16
72
10
2
0

2010-2014
Survey (%
of
respondents)
12
80
5
2
1

Table 5.14: World Values Survey Highest Educational Level Attained
Highest educational
level attained
Inadequately
completed elementary
education
Completed
(compulsory)
elementary education
Incomplete secondary
school:
technical/vocational
type/(Compulsory)
elementary education
and basic vocational
qualification
Complete secondary
school:
technical/vocational
type/Secondary,
intermediate
vocational
qualification
Incomplete
secondary: universitypreparatory
type/Secondary,
intermediate general
qualification
Complete secondary:
universitypreparatory type/Full
secondary, maturity
level certificate
Some university
without degree/Higher
education - lower-level
tertiary certificate
University with
degree/Higher
education - upperlevel tertiary
certificate
Not applicable; No
formal Education
Missing; Unknown

1994-1998
Survey (% of
respondents)

1999-2004
Survey (% of
respondents)

2005-2009
Survey (% of
respondents)

2010-2014
Survey (% of
respondents)

30

20

13

6

31

26

29

44

4

2

8

0

7

5

10

13

3

15

6

12

9

13

16

7

3

6

8

8

13

10

9

7

0
0

2
0

0
1

1
0
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Table 5.15: World Values Survey Size of Town
Size of Town

2005-2009 Survey
(% of respondents)
8
7
9
27
9
16
12
11

Less than 2000 hab.
2-5000
5-10000
10-50000
50-100000
100-250000
More than 250000
Madrid/Barcelona

2010-2014 Survey
(% of respondents)
1
12
8
29
9
14
16
11

Table 5.16: World Values Survey Spain Vs. Italy Family Structure Over Time

No
Children
1 Child
Married
Living
together
as
married
Divorced

Italy
19811984

Spain
19811984

Italy
19891993

Spain
19891993

Italy
19992004

Spain
19992004

Italy
20052009

Spain
20052009

35
17
62

32
10
65

32
20
61

32
13
62

31
17
58

36
13
57

37
19
57

34
16
50

2
0

1
0

2
1

1
1

1

2
1

2
2

5
4

Table 5.17: World Values Survey Spain Vs. Cultural Opinions Over Time

AbortionAlways
Justifiable
AbortionNever
Justifiable
DivorceAlways
Justifiable
DivorceNever
Justifiable
Religion is
very
important

Italy
19811984

Spain
19811984

Italy
19891993

Spain
19891993

Italy
19992004

Spain
19992004

Italy
20052009

Spain
20052009

11%

4%

5%

10%

4%

10%

4%

13%

32%

48%

24%

29%

31%

27%

41%

22%

15%

15%

10%

18%

9%

21%

8%

26%

23%

28%

19%

19%

18%

11%

23%

8v

-

-

34%

23%

33%

18%

34%

15%

Table 5.18: Social/Cultural Modernity Average Score
Average
Score

Germany

Italy

Japan

Spain

Sweden

United
States

3.241

4.321

3.714

3.517

1.759

4.038
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Chapter 6 Tables
Table 6.2 World Values Survey: Democraticness in Own Country
Democraticness in own
Country (1-10)
Not at all Democratic
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Completely democratic
No answer
Don´t know

2005-2009 Survey (% of
respondents)
0%
0%
1%
3%
10%
14%
22%
20%
10%
18%
0%
1%

2010-2014 Survey (% of
respondents)
1%
1%
4%
8%
17%
13%
16%
16%
10%
11%
0%
2%

Table 6.3 World Values Survey: Importance of Democracy
Importance of
Democracy
Not at all important
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Absolutely important
Don´t know

2005-2009 Survey
(% of respondents)
0%
0%
0%
1%
3%
7%
14%
15%
10%
50%
1%

2010-2014 Survey
(% of respondents)
0%
0%
0%
1%
3%
6%
13%
16%
14%
45%
2%

Table 6.4 World Values Survey: Having a democratic political system
Having a
democratic
political system is:
Very good
Fairly good
Fairly bad
Very bad
No answer
Don´t know

1994-1998
Survey (% of
respondents)
42%
47%
3%
2%
0%
6%

1999-2004
Survey (% of
respondents)
47%
37%
3%
1%
2%
10%

2005-2009
Survey (% of
respondents)
56%
36%
2%
1%
0%
4%

2010-2014
Survey (% of
respondents)
58%
33%
2%
1%
1%
4%

Table 6.5 World Values Survey Italy and Spain Political Comparison Over Time
Very Good or
Fairly Good

Italy 19992004

Spain 19992004

Italy 20052009

Spain 20052009

93%

84%

91%

92%
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Table 6.6: Political Modernity Average Score
Average
Score

Germany

Italy

Japan

Spain

Sweden

United
States

2.667

3.667

5

3

1.333

5
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